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Due process requires courts to make decisions based on the evidence before
them without regard to information outside of the record. Skepticism about the
ability of jurors to ignore inadmissible information is widespread. Empirical
research confirms that this skepticism is well-founded. Many courts and commentators, however, assume that judges can accomplish what jurors cannot.
This Article reports the results of experiments we have conducted to determine
whether judges can ignore inadmissible information. We found that the judges
who participated in our experiments struggled to perform this challenging mental task. The judges had difficulty disregarding demands disclosed during a
settlement conference, conversation protected by the attorney-client privilege,
prior sexual history of an alleged rape victim, prior criminal convictions of a
plaintiff, and information the government had promised not to rely upon at
sentencing. This information influenced judges’ decisions even when they were
reminded, or themselves had ruled, that the information was inadmissible. In
contrast, the judges were able to ignore inadmissible information obtained in
violation of a criminal defendant’s right to counsel and the outcome of a search
when determining whether probable cause existed. We conclude that judges are
generally unable to avoid being influenced by relevant but inadmissible infor†
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mation of which they are aware. Nevertheless, judges displayed a surprising
ability to do so in some situations.
INTRODUCTION
1

Trials search for truth by excluding certain truths.
An entire field of law—the law of evidence—is devoted to determining what information is admissible, what information is inadmissi2
ble, and what information may be admitted for limited purposes only.
Decisions based on inadmissible evidence, or on admissible evidence
3
used for an improper purpose, are illegitimate and violate principles
4
of due process. Unless any resulting error is “harmless,” such decisions are subject to reversal.5
Evidence rules excluding relevant information fall into two catego6
ries. First, “intrinsic exclusionary rules” exclude relevant information
7
on the ground that its omission will promote accurate fact finding.
Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which excludes relevant information where its probative value is outweighed by the risk that it
8
will confuse or mislead the fact finder, is an example. Second, “ex-

1

See, e.g., MIRJAN R. DAMAŠKA, EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT 149 (1997) (noting the
“striking emphasis on the screening of information to be submitted to triers of fact”).
2
See Orie L. Phillips, A Symposium On Evidence: Foreword, 5 VAND. L. REV. 275, 275
(1952) (“‘Evidence’ imports the means by which any alleged matter of fact, the truth of
which is submitted to investigation, is established or disproved. It embraces the rules
of law governing the admissibility or rejection of proffered proof and the weight to be
given to proof that is admitted.” (footnote omitted)).
3
See MCCORMICK’S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 51, at 109 n.1 (Edward
W. Cleary ed., 2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter MCCORMICK’S HANDBOOK] (“The fact issues
at the trial should be decided upon the facts ‘in the record,’ i. e. [sic], facts officially
introduced in accordance with the rules of practice, and facts which the court may judicially notice.”).
4
See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970) (“[T]he decisionmaker’s conclusion . . . must rest solely on the legal rules and evidence adduced at the hearing.”).
5
Trial verdicts, however, are seldom reversed due to evidentiary error. See Margaret A. Berger, When, If Ever, Does Evidentiary Error Constitute Reversible Error?, 25 LOY. L.A.
L. REV. 893, 894-96 (1992) (finding that in 1990—a time when the federal district
courts conducted about 20,000 criminal and civil bench and jury trials a year—only
thirty trial verdicts were reversed for evidentiary error: sixteen for erroneous admission and fourteen for erroneous exclusion).
6
See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 401 (defining relevant evidence). Evidence rules also exclude irrelevant information. Id. 402.
7
DAMAŠKA, supra note 1, at 14.
8
See FED. R. EVID. 403 (excluding relevant evidence on grounds of prejudice, confusion, or waste of time).
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trinsic exclusionary rules” exclude relevant evidence to promote a pol9
icy interest, regardless of its impact on the accuracy of fact finding.
Examples include rules excluding evidence of pretrial settlement pro10
posals as well as various privileges, such as the attorney-client privi11
lege.
The best way to prevent inadmissible information from influencing jurors is to shield them from it altogether. Despite the best efforts
of courts, however, jurors are sometimes exposed to inadmissible information through media accounts of the case or impermissible comments by lawyers or witnesses during trial. When such exposure occurs, judges attempt to undermine its influence by instructing jurors
12
to limit their use of the information or to disregard it entirely. Judicial opinions on the issue tend to embrace a “strong presumption that
proper limiting instructions will reduce the possibility of prejudice to
13
an acceptable level.”
Nonetheless, courts and commentators have long worried that ju14
rors cannot “unbit[e] the apple of knowledge.” For example, Justice
Robert Jackson once argued that “[t]he naive assumption that preju9

DAMAŠKA, supra note 1, at 12.
FED. R. EVID. 408; see also id. 410 (excluding guilty pleas). Rule 408 actually is a
hybrid. Evidence of settlement offers is excludable for two reasons: “(1) The evidence
is irrelevant, since the offer may be motivated by a desire for peace rather than from
any concession of weakness of position,” and “(2) . . . promotion of the public policy
favoring the compromise and settlement of disputes.” FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory
committee’s note. Because the latter is described as “a more consistently impressive
ground,” id., Rule 408 is best placed in the extrinsic category.
11
See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976) (noting that the attorneyclient privilege “has the effect of withholding relevant information from the factfinder”).
12
See J. Alexander Tanford, The Law and Psychology of Jury Instructions, 69 NEB. L.
REV. 71, 76-78 (1990) (distinguishing between “admonitions” to disregard evidence
and “limiting instructions” to confine evidence to its proper scope).
13
United States v. Kilcullen, 546 F.2d 435, 447 (1st Cir. 1976); see also Carter v.
Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 301, 303 (1981) (claiming that an instruction to disregard inadmissible testimony is a “powerful tool” that can be used “to remove from the jury’s
deliberations any influence of unspoken adverse inferences” (internal quotation marks
omitted)); United States v. Gomez-Pabon, 911 F.2d 847, 858 (1st Cir. 1990) (“There is
ordinarily a presumption that a jury will follow such curative instructions. This presumption will be defeated only if there is an overwhelming probability that the jury will
. . . be unable to follow the court’s instructions, and a strong likelihood that the effect
would be devastating to the defendant.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (omission
in original)); United States v. Steele, 727 F.2d 580, 588 (6th Cir. 1984) (“[T]he subsequent striking of erroneously admitted evidence accompanied by a clear and positive
instruction to the jury to disregard cures the error.”).
14
DAMAŠKA, supra note 1, at 50.
10
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dicial effects can be overcome by instructions to the jury . . . all prac15
ticing lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction.” Judge Learned Hand
agreed with this skeptical assessment. He said that when judges at16
tempt to “unring the bell” by telling jurors to limit their use of evidence or to ignore it entirely, they are recommending a “mental gymnastic which is beyond, not only their powers, but anybody[]
17
else[’s].” Legal scholars concur that some prohibitory and limiting
18
19
instructions do not work, and may even be counterproductive.

15

Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring).
Leighton Bledsoe, Jury or Nonjury Trial—A Defense Viewpoint, 5 AM. JUR. Trials §
12, at 123, 137 (1966).
17
Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir. 1932). Damaška elaborates
on this as follows:
Consider the cognitive premises of limited admissibility rules, for example.
When jurors are told to use a piece of evidence for a narrow inferential purpose, the successful completion of this task often calls for sophisticated mental
operations. Preventing one’s inference from overflowing into legally forbidden territory can even be a real psychological feat—if it is psychologically possible at all. One of the most obvious examples is the demand that a defendant’s criminal record be used only as it affects the credibility of his in-court
testimony. To prevent the ripple effects of this information from producing a
broader probative impact on belief formation presupposes remarkable selfcontrol and intellectual delicacy. Not much less sophistication is needed to
consider an item of information only for the purpose of determining whether
it was made (rather than also for its truth) or to employ a piece of information
only with regard to one of several joint charges arising from a single event.
DAMAŠKA, supra note 1, at 33.
18
See, e.g., Paul Bergman, Admonishing Jurors to Disregard What They Haven’t Heard,
25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 689, 691 (1992) (“The effectiveness of admonitions to control juror behavior is open to question.”); Tanford, supra note 12, at 86 (“Admonitions . . .
are difficult for jurors to understand . . . .”).
19
See, e.g., ROBERT E. KEETON, TRIAL TACTICS AND METHODS § 4.18, at 204 (2d ed.
1973) (explaining that the serious disadvantage of requesting an instruction telling the
jury to disregard evidence in considering a particular issue is that “it calls to the jury’s
attention your recognition of the relevance of the evidence to the very issue on which
you are seeking to avoid their considering it”); CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C.
KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 41, at 224 (2d ed. 1994) (explaining that requiring
the party seeking to limit the use of evidence to request a limiting instruction “appropriately leaves to the opposing trial counsel the option of concluding that . . . he is better off
without an instruction . . . [as it] would serve only to remind the jury of what it has
heard . . . and . . . to suggest . . . a use for the evidence which is best left unmentioned”);
Dennis J. Devine, Laura D. Clayton, Benjamin B. Dunford, Rasmy Seying & Jennifer
Payne, Jury Decision Making: 45 Years of Empirical Research on Deliberating Groups, 7
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 622, 666 (2001) (“In general, limiting instructions have
proven to be ineffective and have even been associated with a paradoxical increase in
the targeted behavior.”); Tanford, supra note 12, at 86 (“Admonishing jurors often
provokes the opposite of the intended effect.”).
16
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Most observers agree that it is not easy for jurors to deliberately disre20
gard what they know.
Assessments of judges’ capabilities tend to be more generous.
21
22
Some courts and commentators have argued that judges are much

20

See United States v. Delli Paoli, 229 F.2d 319, 321 (2d Cir. 1956) (commenting
that it might be “extreme” to say that nobody can control his reasoning and avoid considering relevant evidence he is told to disregard, but observing that “relatively few persons” can do so because “it does a violence to all our habitual ways of thinking,” and
commenting that limiting instructions are a “placebo” in the context of coconspirator
hearsay admitted against the speaker and that such instructions should not be “the final measure of protection” for defendants), aff’d, 352 U.S. 232 (1957), overruled in part
by Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968) (concluding that such limiting instructions are inadequate protection for defendants); see also JON ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES:
STUDIES IN THE SUBVERSION OF RATIONALITY 47 (1983) (arguing that “it is inherently
impossible to will an empty mind”).
21
See, e.g., Gentile v. State Bar, 501 U.S. 1030, 1077 (1991) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting in part) (“[T]rial judges often have access to inadmissible and highly prejudicial information and are presumed to be able to discount or disregard it.”); Harris v.
Rivera, 454 U.S. 339, 346 (1981) (per curiam) (“In bench trials, judges routinely hear
inadmissible evidence that they are presumed to ignore . . . . It is equally routine for
them to instruct juries that no adverse inference may be drawn from a defendant’s
failure to testify . . . presum[ably] they follow their own instructions when they are acting as factfinders.”); State v. Garcia, 397 P.2d 214, 216 (Ariz. 1964) (holding that in
criminal cases, as in civil cases, the court will not consider improper admission of evidence as error on appeal from a bench trial “because of the presumption that the trial
judge disregarded all inadmissible evidence in reaching his decision”); Peterson v.
State, 61 N.W.2d 263, 265 (Neb. 1953) (“The rule which this court applies in reviewing
a finding of a trial court, in either a civil or a criminal case, . . . is that it is presumed
that improper evidence taken under objection was given no weight in reaching the final conclusion unless the contrary appears.” (quoting Birmingham v. State, 279 N.W.
15, 17 (Wis. 1938)); Commonwealth v. Davis, 421 A.2d 179, 183 n.6 (Pa. 1980) (“A
judge, as factfinder, is presumed to disregard inadmissible evidence and consider only
competent evidence.”); Commonwealth v. Glover, 405 A.2d 945, 947 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1979) (per curiam) (concluding that a judge “must be presumed to be able to disregard inflammatory evidence”). The assumption that judges can ignore inadmissible
information indirectly colors our expectations of lawyers, in addition to judges. See
State v. Moreland, No. 83977, 2004 WL 2829015, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 9, 2004)
(holding that failure to object to evidence during a bench trial in a criminal case was
not ineffective assistance of counsel because “defense counsel could reasonably assume
that the judge would be unaffected by any inflammatory evidence and would disregard
any irrelevant evidence”).
22
See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 11.431,
at 64 (2004) (arguing that judges are good at ignoring inadmissible materials because
they are “accustomed to reviewing matters that may not be admissible”); MUELLER &
KIRKPATRICK, supra note 19, § 3, at 10 (“[I]t is realistic to suppose that judges can do
better than juries in relying on what is admissible and ignoring what is not.”); A. Leo
Levin & Harold K. Cohen, The Exclusionary Rules in Nonjury Criminal Cases, 119 U. PA. L.
REV. 905, 916 (1971) (dismissing the idea “that the rule of admissibility in the nonjury
case should be precisely identical” to the rule of admissibility in the case tried to a jury,
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better able than jurors to ignore inadmissible evidence. Judges themselves often apply evidentiary rules more loosely in bench trials than in
23
jury trials on the theory that “the judge, a professional experienced
in evaluating evidence, may more readily be relied upon to sift and to
24
weigh critically evidence which we fear to entrust to a jury.” This
makes some sense. Experience might enable judges to ignore prejudicial aspects of evidence more readily than jurors, thereby justifying a
looser interpretation of the intrinsic exclusionary rules. Judges also
likely understand and respect the purposes behind the extrinsic exclusionary rules more so than jurors, thereby providing judges with
greater motivation to ignore the evidence that these rules proscribe.
Indeed, some commentators have even suggested that legal systems
should have separate rules of evidence for jury trials and bench trials
because of assumed differences in the motivation and capabilities of
25
jurors and judges.

since “[f]eats of discrimination are expected of the jurors and it is not unreasonable to
allow an added measure of tolerance where it is the judge who will be weighing the
evidence”).
23
Based upon the assumption that the greater training and experience of trial
judges immunize them against mistakes to which jurors may be susceptible, some
courts have stated that the rules of evidence apply less strictly in bench trials than in
jury trials. See, e.g., Smith v. Mitchell, 348 F.3d 177, 206 (6th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he argument was to a three-judge panel, so any inflammatory effect was de minimis . . . .”);
Walker v. NationsBank of Fla. N.A., 53 F.3d 1548, 1554 (11th Cir. 1995) (noting that
for certain types of evidence, courts apply a more “liberal admissibility rule” in bench
trials than in jury trials, and adding that “the distinction between a bench and a jury
trial may affect” the analysis of whether relevant information should be excluded under Rule 403); see also MCCORMICK’S HANDBOOK, supra note 3, § 60, at 137 (“It might
have been more expedient if these rules [of evidence] had been, at least in the main,
discarded in trials before judges. Their professional experience in valuing evidence
greatly lessens the need for exclusionary rules.” (footnote omitted)); MUELLER &
KIRKPATRICK, supra note 19, § 3, at 9-10 (explaining that, although “[t]he Federal Rules
of Evidence apply alike in cases tried to courts and cases tried to juries,” judges in
bench-tried cases “usually apply the Rules with less rigor and let in more evidence”);
Levin & Cohen, supra note 22, at 905 (“It should occasion no surprise that the vast welter of doctrine which has become our law of evidence is not applied with equal rigor
when a judge rather than a jury sits as trier of the fact.”); John MacArthur Maguire &
Charles S.S. Epstein, Rules of Evidence in Preliminary Controversies as to Admissibility, 36
YALE L.J. 1101, 1116-17 (1927) (observing that the willingness of some courts to indulge the presumption that judges always weigh evidence in accordance with the law
has meant that the trial judge is bound “somewhat less finically” by the evidence rules).
24
Levin & Cohen, supra note 22, at 906.
25
See, e.g., Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Rules of Evidence for Nonjury Cases, 50
A.B.A. J. 723, 725 (1964) (proposing that the evidence rules designed to guide juries
should give way to enlarged discretion and broad standards for bench trials); Kenneth
Culp Davis, Hearsay in Nonjury Cases, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1363 (1970) (arguing that
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27

Other courts and commentators are skeptical that judges are
any better than jurors at disregarding inadmissible evidence. In Sum28
merlin v. Stewart, for example, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the Su29
preme Court’s decision in Ring v. Arizona, which prohibits judges
from conducting fact finding in capital sentencing, applied retroactively. The court based its decision in part on its concern that judges
judges should be allowed to admit hearsay in nonjury cases without ruling on its admissibility and, in some cases, base findings on such evidence); G.D. Nokes, The English
Jury and the Law of Evidence, 31 TUL. L. REV. 153, 171 (1956) (supporting legislation in
England that distinguishes between bench and jury trials in determining the admissibility of hearsay, and urging abolition of the rule against hearsay in civil bench trials).
See generally F.R. Lacy, “Civilizing” Nonjury Trials, 19 VAND. L. REV. 73 (1965) (contending that it would be feasible to establish separate procedural rules for bench and jury
trials).
26
See, e.g., United States ex rel. Spears v. Rundle, 268 F. Supp. 691, 696 (E.D. Pa.
1967) (stating that it is “impossible” for a judge to “objectively and reliably determine
that the [defendant’s allegedly involuntary] confession was voluntary after considering
his guilt”), aff’d, 405 F.2d 1037 (3d Cir. 1969) (per curiam); id. at 695 (“[The task of
deliberately disregarding] “becomes too great when we require a judge who has heard
evidence of guilt, to objectively and coldly assess a distinct issue as to the voluntariness
of the confession. Objectivity cannot be guaranteed, and reliability must be questioned.”); United States ex rel. Owens v. Cavell, 254 F. Supp. 154, 154 (M.D. Pa. 1966)
(questioning, in a case where an allegedly involuntary confession was admitted into
evidence, “whether a judge sitting as fact-finder would be able to pass on guilt or innocence without being influenced by evidence relating to the voluntariness issue”, cited in
Rundle, 268 F. Supp. at 695-96; State v. Hutchinson, 271 A.2d 641, 644 (Md. 1970) (acknowledging that “judges, being flesh and blood, are subject to the same emotions and
human frailties as affect other members of the specie [sic],” but going on to state that a
judge, due to “his legal training, traditional approach to problems, and the very state
of the art of his profession,” and his ability “to perceive, distinguish and interpret the
nuances of the law,” is nevertheless fortified against those frailties).
27
See, e.g., DAMAŠKA, supra note 1, at 50 (“[T]he juryless court is a unitary tribunal:
the admissibility of evidence is decided here by the ultimate fact finder, who inevitably
comes into contact with tainted information. And when this information is persuasive,
the professional judge has as much trouble ignoring the acquired knowledge as do
amateur adjudicators.”); Bledsoe, supra note 16, § 12, at 137 (questioning “whether
anyone can ‘unring the bell’ once it is heard,” that is, whether a judge can “persuade
himself not to be influenced by facts which the law in its wisdom, gained from long experience over the centuries, has decreed should not be heard by the trier of facts,” and
opining that “unfavorable evidence thus received probably does exert an undesirable
influence on the court as trier of the facts”); Levin & Cohen, supra note 22, at 910
(recognizing that “it would be wrong to assume a priori that a judge would be immune
from prejudice” from inadmissible information); Maguire & Epstein, supra note 23, at
1115 (explaining that some incompetent evidence may affect judges because “[n]ature
does not furnish a jurist’s brain with thought-tight compartments to suit the convenience of legal theory, and convincing evidence once heard does leave its mark”).
28
341 F.3d 1082, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc), rev’d sub nom. Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 2519 (2004).
29
536 U.S. 584 (2002).
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are likely to be inappropriately influenced by inadmissible information they may encounter during sentencing. As the court noted,
the judge is exposed to prejudicial information which the law, in its regard for the right of the defendant, aims to screen out of the evaluation
of his guilt or innocence. The law’s ideal in this situation may be something of a libertarian luxury. Our only point is that the law cannot easily
30
achieve it without a jury.

Still others assert that judges can disregard inadmissible information in some circumstances, but not in others. For example, in a suit
brought by the Sierra Club and Judicial Watch against Vice President
31
Cheney, Justice Scalia implied that judges possess a limited ability to
compartmentalize their knowledge. Prior to the Supreme Court hearing in the case, the Vice President and Justice Scalia had gone duck
32
hunting together. Defending his refusal to recuse himself, Justice
Scalia noted that social contacts between high-level officials and Justices of the Supreme Court have “never been thought improper” in
cases involving actions the official took in an “official capacity” rather
33
than a “personal capacity.” These assertions imply that if the Vice
President were sued in an unofficial capacity, Justice Scalia’s personal
knowledge of the Vice President’s character would impinge on his
ability to decide the case fairly. But because the suit involved only the
official aspects of the Vice President’s life, Justice Scalia argued that he
could set aside his personal knowledge about the Vice President. According to Justice Scalia, judges can disregard information outside the
record, but this ability has its limits.
This Article reports the results of experiments designed to test the
ability of trial court judges to disregard inadmissible information.
30

341 F.3d at 1113 (quoting HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN
JURY 127 (1966)). The Supreme Court’s reversal of the Ninth Circuit decision arose,
in part, from the conclusion that judicial fact finding does not “seriously diminish[]”
the accuracy of the sentencing process. 124 S. Ct. at 2525 (emphasis omitted). The
majority did not directly address the issue of whether judges can ignore inadmissible
information, instead relying on the casual observation that “for every argument why
juries are more accurate factfinders, there is another why they are less accurate.” Id.
For the majority, the most notable argument for the superiority of judges is judges’ experience and understanding of the law. Id.
31
In re Cheney, 334 F.3d 1096 (D.C. Cir. 2003), vacated by Cheney v. United States
Dist. Court, 124 S. Ct. 2576 (2004).
32
See David G. Savage, Trip with Cheney Puts Ethics Spotlight on Scalia, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 17, 2004, at A1 (noting that the “longtime friends” spent time hunting together
just three weeks after the Court agreed to hear Cheney’s appeal).
33
Id.
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Based on judges’ responses to seven scenarios that simulate the kinds
of decisions that judges make (insofar as is possible given the limits of
the experimental setting), we found that some types of highly relevant, but inadmissible, evidence influenced the judges’ decisions. We
also found, however, that the judges were able to resist the influence
of such information in at least some cases, namely those directly implicating constitutional rights.
Our Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, we examine the psychological research on ignoring relevant information. We observe that
people have difficulty deliberately disregarding information, and we
identify three explanations for this phenomenon. We then discuss
what psychologists have learned about the impact of this phenomenon
on mock jurors. In Part II, we introduce our study of this phenomenon in trial judges. In Part III, we provide the results of our experiments. We describe the seven scenarios we administered, report our
findings, and briefly discuss the implications of the data we collected.
In Part IV, we explore some of the broader ramifications of our study
for the refinement of the justice system.
Our research supports three tentative policy recommendations.
First, we recommend that courts should separate “managerial judg34
ing” from adjudication. In particular, a judge who supervises settlement discussions should not serve as the fact finder in the same case.
Second, we contend that jury trials should be favored over bench trials
because judges can shield jurors from inadmissible information in
ways that they cannot shield themselves. Third, we suggest that guidelines or schedules should be adopted for amorphous categories of
damages—like pain and suffering damages—in civil cases. Such
guidelines could structure and constrain judicial discretion and
thereby limit the effect of inadmissible information encountered on
judicial decision making.

34

See Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 376-77 (1982) (describing the “managerial” approach” that a growing number of judges have adopted,
whereby judges not only adjudicate claims but also actively shape litigation, supervise
case preparation, and influence results).
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I. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DELIBERATELY DISREGARDING
People often forget or ignore important information, but they
35
have difficulty doing so intentionally. Several theories might account
36
for a failure to disregard information. First, people who face instructions to ignore information might not want to ignore it and might attend to it even in the face of instructions to disregard it (motivation).
Second, even if they want to ignore information, people might find it
difficult to avoid thinking about information they want to ignore
(ironic process theory). Third, even if people can ignore the new information itself, the information might still affect their judgment: information can influence the processing of subsequent events and can
inspire beliefs that are not easily dispelled (mental contamination).
Information quickly contaminates thinking because it affects how
people process and store facts and beliefs. Even if people ignore the
initial information, its influence might still be felt. These theories all
suggest that suppressing the influence of information that is supposed
37
to be ignored will be difficult. Research on deliberate forgetting
supports this concern.
A. Motivation
Motivation is critical to ignoring known information. People who
do not agree that the relevant information should be ignored are apt
to rely on it when making a decision. For example, jurors instructed
to ignore a damning piece of evidence might well decide to rely on it
anyway, doing a bit of rough justice by convicting a defendant they believe to be guilty. People who are simply told to ignore relevant information are unlikely to do so without being provided an explanation
as to why they should ignore the evidence. Direct, but unexplained,

35
See Hollyn M. Johnson, Processes of Successful Intentional Forgetting, 116 PSYCHOL.
BULL. 274, 274 (1994) (noting that the “success of intentional forgetting depends on
how one originally encoded the to-be-forgotten information”).
36
See, e.g., Jonathan M. Golding & Debra L. Long, There’s More to Intentional Forgetting than Directed Forgetting: An Integrative Review, in INTENTIONAL FORGETTING:
INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACHES 59, 93 (Jonathan M. Golding & Colin M. MacLeod
eds., 1998) (reporting that “there is no consensus on the mechanisms that affect intentional forgetting”).
37
For a different taxonomy of the theoretical explanations for this phenomenon,
see Richard M. Wenzlaff & Daniel M. Wagner, Thought Suppression, 51 ANN. REV.
PSYCHOL. 59, 66-69 (2000).
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instructions to disregard relevant information might well go unheeded.
Indeed, research on “psychological reactance” indicates that instructions to ignore information might increase people’s desire to at38
tend to it. “Reactance occurs when decision makers feel that their
freedom of choice is threatened and they respond by acting in ways
that will restore their sense of decision-making freedom . . . . [M]ore
severe restrictions on decision-making freedom are more likely to
39
arouse reactance.” Most people refer to reactance as “reverse psychology.” The basic idea is that when an individual is told to do something that limits her freedom, she may rebel against that direction to
restore her own sense of autonomy. In studies of consumer behavior,
for example, eliminating an option that had been available as a choice
40
increases its attractiveness. Reactance can be particularly strong in
people who face instructions on how to think. In one study, individuals who initially supported a particular position largely reversed themselves when told that they “ha[d] no choice” but to agree with that po41
sition.
In the context of a trial, jurors might view instructions to ignore
evidence as an unwarranted intrusion on their ability to decide a case
42
as they see fit. “Responding to this threat to their freedom, jurors
may not only be motivated to ignore the instruction to disregard the

38

See JACK W. BREHM, A THEORY OF PSYCHOLOGICAL REACTANCE 18 (1966) (“[I]f a
specific behavioral freedom of a person is eliminated by impersonal events, he will experience reactance and consequently will see increased attractiveness in the eliminated
behavior.” (emphasis omitted)). See generally SHARON S. BREHM & JACK W. BREHM,
PSYCHOLOGICAL REACTANCE: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND CONTROL (1981) (reviewing
the theory of psychological reactance).
39
Jennifer K. Robbennolt & Christina A. Studebaker, Anchoring in the Courtroom:
The Effects of Caps on Punitive Damages, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 353, 356 (1999).
40
See, e.g., Jack W. Brehm, Lloyd K. Stires, John Sensenig & Janet Shaban, The Attractiveness of an Eliminated Choice Alternative, 2 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 301, 306
(1966) (reporting results of an experiment indicating that when a particular choice of
a selection of music was suddenly eliminated from the options available, it became
more attractive).
41
Melvin L. Snyder & Robert A. Wicklund, Prior Exercise of Freedom and Reactance, 12
J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 120, 122-23 (1976).
42
See Shari Seidman Diamond & Neil Vidmar, Jury Room Ruminations on Forbidden
Topics, 87 VA. L. REV. 1857, 1865 (2001) (explaining that reactance theory posits that
“jurors see the admonition as an attempt to restrict their freedom to weigh and evaluate probative evidence in reaching their verdict”).
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inadmissible evidence, but may even focus more attention on the evi43
dence they were instructed to ignore.”
B. Ironic Process Theory
Motivation aside, suppressing known information presents a challenging cognitive task. Refraining from thinking unwanted thoughts
is so difficult that it can produce an “ironic process” in which people
ultimately spend even more time thinking about thoughts they are try44
ing to suppress. When people attempt to suppress a thought, they
monitor their mental activity to verify that suppression is proceeding
successfully. To do so, however, they must keep the forbidden
thought available so that they can compare it to their existing mental
45
state and confirm that they are not thinking the forbidden thought.
As psychologists describe it:
[A]ttempts to influence mental states require monitoring processes that
are sensitive to the failure of the attempts . . . . [W]hen efforts to implement the intended mental control are undermined in any way, the monitoring process itself will surface and ironically overwhelm the intended
46
control to yield the opposite of the mental state that is desired.

Thought suppression, then, is an “ironic” process in that “[t]he inten47
tion to suppress a thought creates the opposite of what is wanted.”
Researchers have used the following example to illustrate the
ironic process theory:
[A]n alcoholic who is struggling to keep thoughts of an icy, cold beer
completely out of mind may at various points say to himself or herself, “I
haven’t thought about having a beer for the last 5 hours.” Of course,
upon making such an observation, the person has thought of the enticing beverage. This monitoring of potential intrusions of an unwanted

43

Id.; see also Joel D. Lieberman & Jamie Arndt, Understanding the Limits of Limiting
Instructions: Social Psychological Explanations for the Failures of Instructions to Disregard Pretrial Publicity and Other Inadmissible Evidence, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 677, 703 (2000)
(“It may frequently be that jurors are motivated to maintain their freedom, and thus
the ineffectiveness of limiting instructions can be explained by the provocation of reactance.”).
44
Daniel M. Wegner, Ironic Processes of Mental Control, 101 PSYCHOL. REV. 34, 34
(1994).
45
See id. (describing the difficulty people experience when trying to suppress
thoughts).
46
Id.
47
Daniel M. Wegner & Ralph Erber, The Hyperaccessibility of Suppressed Thoughts, 63
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 903, 908 (1992).
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thought paradoxically keeps the thought accessible to consciousness and
may lead to a rebound effect, or a resurgence of the thought following
48
attempts to suppress it . . . .
49

In one memorable experiment illustrating ironic processing, researchers instructed undergraduates participating in an elaborate
50
study “not to think of a white bear.” The participants had great difficulty carrying out this seemingly simple task. They reported that they
thought about a white bear “more than once per minute even when
51
directly instructed to try not to think of a white bear.” Furthermore,
efforts to suppress thoughts of a white bear increased the rate at which
participants reported thoughts of a white bear in a subsequent “free”
session in which they were asked only to report thoughts of a white
bear (but not actively suppress them). The study suggests two principles of the human mind that make it difficult to ignore relevant material: first, it is difficult, if not impossible, to ignore even an arbitrary
and unremarkable image like a white bear; second, efforts to suppress
thoughts about a subject might actually produce more thoughts about
that subject.
Efforts to control thought processes are subject to both cognitive
and motivational limitations that make the task difficult and can lead
to ironic results. Whether the thought is of a white bear, a rhinoc52
53
eros, a hippopotamus, or an inadmissible confession, people cannot
48

Anita E. Kelly & Margaret M. Nauta, Reactance and Thought Suppression, 23
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1123, 1123 (1997) (emphasis omitted).
49
Daniel M. Wegner, David J. Schneider, Samuel R. Carter III & Teri L. White,
Paradoxical Effects of Thought Suppression, 53 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5 (1987)
(discussing an experiment in which students were “randomly assigned to one of two
experimental conditions, an initial suppression condition or an initial expression condition” (emphases omitted)).
50
Id. at 6-7.
51
Id. at 7.
52
See Lang v. Kohl’s Food Stores, Inc., 217 F.3d 919, 927 (7th Cir. 2000) (comparing a hypothetical judicial instruction ordering jurors to disregard a report to “telling
the jurors that for the remainder of the trial none of them was allowed to say the word
‘rhinoceros’ to himself”).
53
According to the Seventh Circuit:
We do not pretend that a jury can keep one inference in mind without thinking about the other. An instruction told the jury to do this, but this is like telling someone not to think about a hippopotamus. To tell someone not to
think about the beast is to assure at least a fleeting mental image. So it is here.
Each juror must have had both the legitimate and the forbidden considerations somewhere in mind, if only in the subconscious.
United States v. DeCastris, 798 F.2d 261, 264-65 (7th Cir. 1986) (footnote omitted).
The court went on to describe the unwelcome consequences of admitting evidence of
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easily successfully implement a decision to refrain from thinking a
particular thought. Efforts to control the thoughts of others might
also induce people to resist such efforts actively. In short, people
might not want to suppress thoughts and might not be able to do so,
even if they try.
C. Mental Contamination
The prevailing view of belief formation, associated with Descartes,
posits that people form beliefs by first comprehending a piece of information and then freely deciding whether to accept it as accurate or
54
dismiss it as inaccurate. An alternate view, associated with Spinoza,
posits that people initially accept as accurate every proposition they
55
comprehend and then decide whether to “unbelieve” it. Building on
Spinoza’s work, psychologists argue that misleading or inaccurate information produces a “mental contamination” that persists even after
people become aware that the information is misleading or inaccu56
rate. This “unconscious or uncontrollable mental processing . . . re57
sults in unwanted judgments, emotions, or behavior.”
The brain
does not store information in isolated units, but in a connected whole.
Information thus influences how the brain processes new stimuli.
New information also facilitates the construction of beliefs that might
persist, even if the information is discredited.

other wrongs because the “bad character” inference is frequently inseparable from the
“bad intent” inference. Id.
54
See Daniel T. Gilbert, Inferential Correction, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 167, 180 (Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin & Daniel Kahneman eds., 2002) (“[Descartes] was the first to suggest that understanding and
believing are separate and sequential psychological operations.”); see also Daniel T. Gilbert, How Mental Systems Believe, 46 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 107, 108 (1991) (describing
Descartes’ philosophy).
55
See Gilbert, Inferential Correction, supra note 54, at 180 (“[Spinoza] argued that
understanding and believing are a single mental operation. [He] suggested that human beings believe assertions as part of understanding them, and that they then ‘unbelieve’ those assertions that are found to be at odds with other established facts.”); see
also Gilbert, How Mental Systems Believe, supra note 54, at 108 (describing Spinoza’s philosophy).
56
Timothy D. Wilson, David B. Centerbar & Nancy Brekke, Mental Contamination
and the Debiasing Program, in HEURISTICS & BIASES, supra note 54, at 185, 185; see also
Timothy D. Wilson & Nancy Brekke, Mental Contamination and Mental Correction: Unwanted Influences on Judgments and Evaluations, 116 PSYCHOL. BULL. 117, 117 (1994) (describing “mental contamination”).
57
Wilson, Centerbar & Brekke, supra note 56, at 185.
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What makes mental contamination particularly pernicious is that
58
it can operate outside of conscious thought. People might not even
realize how new information has affected their judgment and are thus
ill-equipped to contain its influence. Consequently, merely suppressing thoughts of the unwanted information will not prevent it from affecting judgment. “[T]he failure to appreciate the perils of mental
contamination may lead people to design decision-making systems”—
including the American legal system—“that are destined to produce
59
biased judgments.”
1. Contaminated Information Processing
Insulating a decision-making process from inadmissible information requires preventing this information from influencing how subsequent information is processed. This can be challenging because
information changes how we think. It creates beliefs that can guide
the integration and assessment of subsequent information. In the jargon of social cognition, information can activate a schema, or organizing principle. An activated schema colors how we think in every way.
60
It makes some memories and beliefs more available than others. It
also guides attention and interpretation of new information. Suppressing the influence of information thus requires both suppressing
the new information and suppressing the influence of the scheme on
processing of subsequent information.
Consider the following example. What activity does the following
paragraph describe?
The procedure is actually quite simple. First you arrange things into different groups depending on their makeup. Of course, one pile may be
sufficient depending on how much there is to do. If you have to go
somewhere else due to lack of facilities that is the next step, otherwise
you are pretty well set. It is important not to overdo any particular endeavor. That is, it is better to do too few things at once than too many.
In the short run this may not seem important, but complications from
doing too many can easily arise. A mistake can be expensive as well. The
manipulation of the appropriate mechanisms should be self-explanatory,
58

See id. (“[P]eople have poor access to the processes by which they form their
judgments . . . .”).
59
Id. at 196.
60
See John D. Bransford & Marcia K. Johnson, Contextual Prerequisites for Understanding: Some Investigations of Comprehension and Recall, 11 J. VERBAL LEARNING & VERBAL
BEHAV. 717, 718-22 (1972) (concluding that contextual information impacts the interpretation of new information).
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and we need not dwell on it here. At first the whole procedure will seem
complicated. Soon, however, it will become just another facet of life. It
is difficult to foresee any end to this task in the immediate future, but
61
then one never can tell.

Now suppose you learn that the passage is entitled “washing clothes.”
It is inconceivable that you can read the passage with the same understanding of its meaning after learning the title. The title triggers a
psychological schema that inevitably organizes the flow of the information in the passage. Knowing the title influences what people remember about the passage and how they think about it. The influence of knowing the title is impossible to suppress effectively.
The profound influence of activated schemata underlies the dramatic effect of first impressions. Solomon Asch provided one of the
62
most compelling demonstrations of this almost sixty years ago. Asch
read subjects one of two sets of adjectives said to describe an individual’s personality:
A. intelligent-–industrious-–impulsive-–critical–-stubborn–-envious
63

B. envious–-stubborn–-critical–-impulsive-–industrious–-intelligent

As Asch reported:
The two series are identical . . . differing only in the order . . . .
. . . The impression produced by A is predominantly that of an able
person who possesses certain shortcomings which do not, however, overshadow his merits. On the other hand, B impresses [most subjects] as a
“problem,” whose abilities are hampered by his serious difficulties. . . .
[S]ome of the qualities (e.g., impulsiveness, criticalness) are interpreted
in a positive way under Condition A, while they take on, under Condition
64
B, a negative color.

The initial adjectives color the assessment of ambiguous adjectives that
follow. The same cognitive process is thought to underlie the widely
65
documented social phenomenon of “halo effects.” Halo effects are
the tendency to assume that like goes with like: that beautiful or tall

61

Id. at 722.
S.E. Asch, Forming Impressions of Personality, 41 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSCYHOL. 258
(1946).
63
Id. at 270 (emphasis added).
64
Id. (emphasis added).
65
See Seymour Rosenberg & Karen Olshan, Evaluative and Descriptive Aspects in Personality Perception, 16 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 619, 619-21 (1970) (reviewing
studies of halo effects in judgments of character).
62
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people are nice, smart, and capable, while ugly and short people are
mean, dumb, and incapable. Salient information (such as height or
attractiveness) activates positive or negative associations that color how
people process everything else they learn about an individual.
When information affects how people think about subsequent information, suppressing its influence on judgment will be most challenging. The organizing schemata that information triggers can be
invisible, making it hard to know what would have been different had
the information not been available.
2. Belief Perseverance
As the mind continues to dwell on the information to be forgotten, it elaborates on that information and incorporates it into an intricate belief system which in turn affects subsequent information proc66
essing. Social psychologists call this “belief perseverance.” When
people acquire new information, they quickly incorporate it into their
knowledge that they already possess. Once they have done so, they are
likely to have great difficulty undoing the beliefs that the information
67
inspired.
Social psychologist Lee Ross and his colleagues were the first to
68
demonstrate belief perseverance directly. They gave undergraduate
subjects the grisly task of evaluating ten suicide notes. They informed
the subjects that five were actual suicide notes and that five had been
created for the experiment. The subjects ostensibly had to identify
the real notes. Afterwards, the experimenters told some of the subjects that they had performed well at the task (scoring nine out of ten
right) and others that they had performed poorly (scoring below fifty
percent). Later, the experimenters informed the subjects that, in fact,
all of the notes were fakes. The subjects then had to estimate how well
they would perform a real version of such a task. Subjects who had
66

See generally Lee Ross, Mark R. Lepper & Michael Hubbard, Perseverance in SelfPerception and Social Perception: Biased Attributional Processes in the Debriefing Paradigm, 32
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 880 (1975). Another way of thinking about this phenomenon is that once individuals encounter information, it may become part of a
“schema” or organizing principle that influences how they subsequently evaluate additional information.
67
See Saul M. Kassin & Christina A. Studebaker, Instructions to Disregard and the Jury:
Curative and Paradoxical Effects, in INTENTIONAL FORGETTING, supra note 36, at 413, 415
(“[I]nstructions to disregard may fail when the discredited information has already activated the formation of a theory or explanatory structure.”).
68
Ross, Lepper & Hubbard, supra note 66, at 884-88.
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been told that they had performed well indicated that they would do
well, subjects who had been told that they had performed badly indicated that they would do poorly. Even though they knew that the
feedback they had received was completely bogus, the beliefs they had
formed about their capabilities persisted. In large part, this belief perseverance resulted from the subjects’ tendency to try to explain to
themselves why they had performed well or poorly. For example, one
subject, told she had done well, stated that she had concluded she was
good at evaluating suicide notes because she enjoyed the poetry of
Sylvia Plath, who had killed herself. Even though the feedback she
had received was discredited, her new beliefs persisted.
In another study of belief perseverance analogous to a courtroom
setting, researchers recruited students to participate in a purported
69
Unbeknownst to the participants, the re“creativity” assessment.
searchers also recruited confederates. The confederates provided
negative information to several of the participants about a teaching
assistant involved in the study. Later, the researchers asked all of the
participants to rate the teaching assistant on a scale from one (least
nice) to ten (nicest). The researchers assigned the participants to
four groups: a control group and three experimental groups (Groups
Two, Three, and Four). Participants in the control group did not receive the negative information about the teaching assistant and gave
70
her a mean rating of 9.33 on the researchers’ “niceness” scale. Participants in Group Two, who heard the negative information about the
71
teaching assistant, gave her a significantly lower rating of 6.58. Participants in Group Three heard the negative information but were instructed by the confederate to disregard it because “I probably
72
shouldn’t have told you those things.” They gave the teaching assis73
tant a mean rating of 6.71. Group Four participants heard the negative information but were instructed by the confederate to disregard it
because “that wasn’t the [teaching assistant], it was someone else
74
[whom I was thinking about].” They gave the teaching assistant a

69

Jonathan M. Golding & Jerry Hauselt, When Instructions to Forget Become Instructions to Remember, 20 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 178, 180 (1994).
70
Id. at 182 tbl.1.
71
Id.
72
Id. at 181.
73
Id. at 182 tbl.1.
74
Id. at 181.
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mean rating of 8.09, still well below the rating given by the control
75
group participants.
In this study, the negative information to which the participants
were exposed continued to affect their evaluation of the teaching assistant even when they were told to forget it. Moreover, the effectiveness of the instruction to disregard the information was greater when
the confederate discredited the information by explaining that it was
incorrect than when the confederate asked the participants to forget
the information simply because she should not have revealed it to
them. Telling the participants that the information was incorrect did
not neutralize its effect on judgment, however. Subjects who had received discredited negative information still rated the teaching assistant as less nice than those subjects in the control group, who were not
exposed to the negative information.
Belief perseverance illustrates a critical impediment to ignoring
known information. Information triggers a cascade of thoughts as
part of the brain’s effort to construct and to maintain a coherent set of
beliefs. Merely ignoring the information itself is not enough. The inferences that explain and accommodate the information into an integrated picture of the world must also be ignored, or the information
76
will affect decision making indirectly.
The rapid integration of information into a coherent story that
produces belief perseverance also produces a related phenomenon,
the hindsight bias. The hindsight bias refers to the tendency for the
77
past to seem more predictable than it actually was. It occurs largely
because once events unfold, the mind automatically makes inferences
based upon its knowledge of the outcome. When viewed in this light,
antecedent events that are likely to have produced the actual outcome
seem more significant than those that were likely to have produced
different outcomes. Consequently, people think the actual outcome
was more predictable or foreseeable than it was. The hindsight bias is
thus one instance in which people cannot ignore known information.
The fact that the particular outcome occurred cannot easily be ignored, even when people are asked to do so.

75

Id. at 182 tbl.1.
See Bransford & Johnson, supra note 60, at 717-18 (relating the influence of
deep structure and integration of experiences on comprehension of a sentence).
77
See generally Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571 (1998) (explaining the hindsight bias and its presence in
the legal system).
76
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Both contaminated information processing and belief perseverance have obvious implications for efforts to disregard inadmissible
evidence. Inadmissible evidence presented early in a trial might affect
how juries and judges organize and interpret evidence presented later,
thereby contaminating their decision-making processes. Inadmissible
evidence presented late in a trial might cause juries and judges to reassess their evaluation of the evidence that preceded it. Thus, even if
a fact finder can avoid using inadmissible evidence directly, the associations and inferences that flow naturally from that inadmissible evidence can still affect judgment indirectly.
D. Disregarding Information in a Legal Setting:
Mock Jury Studies
Many researchers have investigated whether mock jurors are able
to disregard inadmissible evidence in experiments involving trial-like
78
settings. With one notable exception, this work has not examined
judges. Nevertheless, this research could suggest mechanisms that facilitate or impede judges’ ability to ignore known information.
One of the earliest such experiments asked adults eligible for jury
service to listen to a tape recording of a hypothetical trial in a negligence case in which the plaintiff had been injured when the car in
which she was a passenger collided with a car driven by the defen79
dant. The subjects were divided into three groups of juries. The
three groups reviewed the same trial materials except for variations in
a discussion of the defendant’s insurance coverage. In all cases, liability was reasonably clear; in fact, of the thirty mock juries studied,
twenty-eight found for the plaintiff, one jury hung, and one found for
80
the defendant. The first group learned that the defendant had no
insurance—a fact admitted into evidence without objection. These
81
juries awarded the plaintiff an average of $33,000. The second group
learned that the defendant had insurance—a fact also admitted into
evidence without objection. These juries awarded the plaintiff an av-

78

Stephan Landsman & Richard F. Rakos, A Preliminary Inquiry into the Effects of Potentially Biasing Information on Judges and Jurors in Civil Litigation, 12 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 113
(1994) (discussed infra notes 116-17 and accompanying text).
79
Dale W. Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 NEB. L. REV. 744, 753-54
(1959).
80
Id. at 754.
81
Id.
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82

erage of $37,000. The third group learned that the defendant had
insurance, but it also heard an objection to that evidence, and was instructed by the judge to disregard it. The third group of juries
83
awarded the plaintiff an average of $46,000.
This experiment suggests that the rule excluding evidence of a defendant’s insurance serves its intended purpose. If juries are informed that the defendant has insurance, the damage award will tend
84
to be higher if liability is found. The second important lesson of the
experiment, however, is less encouraging. An instruction to disregard
such evidence might induce jurors to give the evidence more weight
than they otherwise would. The author of the experiment concluded
that the “fuss” made over the defendant’s insurance emphasized the
85
fact that the defendant was insured.
The results of this early experiment were partly confirmed by a
86
more recent experiment based upon a hypothetical criminal trial.
Researchers gave college students a summary of a criminal case in
which the defendant was charged with murdering his estranged wife
and a male neighbor. The evidence against the defendant was weak.
The researchers divided the subjects into four groups. The only difference across the four groups was whether inculpatory statements
made by the defendant during a tape-recorded telephone call to a
friend were presented, and if so, how the judge reacted to the inculpatory statements. The wiretap evidence was not presented to the first
group, and twenty-four percent of the subjects in that group found the
87
defendant guilty. The wiretap evidence was presented to the second
group, and was ruled admissible over the defendant’s objection. This
produced a seventy-nine percent conviction rate among the subjects in
88
the second group. The wiretap evidence was also presented to the

82

Id.
Id.
84
Whether damage awards would be unfairly high if jurors were informed that the
defendant had insurance, or whether they would be unfairly low if they were not so informed, is a separate issue. For present purposes it suffices to point out that concealing the defendant’s insurance coverage does tend to reduce damage awards, whether
for good or for ill.
85
Broeder, supra note 79, at 754.
86
Saul M. Kassin & Samuel R. Sommers, Inadmissible Testimony, Instructions to Disregard, and the Jury: Substantive Versus Procedural Considerations, 23 PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 1046, 1047-53 (1997).
87
Id. at 1049.
88
Id.
83
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third and fourth groups, both of which were instructed to disregard it,
albeit for different reasons. The third group was told that the defendant’s objection was sustained, and that the evidence should be disregarded because it had been illegally obtained without a warrant. Fiftyfive percent of the subjects in the third group found the defendant
89
guilty. The fourth group was told that the objection was sustained,
and the evidence should be disregarded because the audio tape of the
telephone call was so inaudible that it could not be determined what
was said. Twenty-four percent of the subjects in the fourth group
90
found the defendant guilty.
Contrary to the results of the previous experiment, this experiment suggests that inadmissible evidence receives less weight than
admissible evidence. The results are inconsistent with the results in
the experiment based on the hypothetical civil trial, which suggest
that excluding evidence caused it to be valued more highly than did
91
admitting the same evidence. On the other hand, this experiment
shows a difference in the effect of excluding evidence depending
upon the nature of the reason given for the exclusion. The subjects in
group three were told that the evidence was inadmissible because it
had been illegally obtained without a warrant. Although the wiretap
evidence influenced them less than it did the subjects in group two,
who were told that the evidence was admissible, the subjects in group
three were more influenced by the wiretap evidence than were the
subjects in group four, who were told that the evidence was inadmissible because it was unreliable. This study suggests that the reason
given for exclusion matters. Minimizing the influence of the inadmissible information might require emphasizing the unreliability of the
evidence rather than merely its failure to comply with technical legal
standards. This experiment also suggests that if the reason for exclusion is compelling, an instruction to disregard the inadmissible evidence allows the decision maker to behave almost as if she had never
92
been exposed to the information.
The divergent outcomes of the numerous other experiments conducted on the ability of mock jurors to deliberately disregard inadmis-

89

Id.
Id.
91
See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
92
But see Kerri L. Pickel, Inducing Jurors to Disregard Inadmissible Evidence: A Legal
Explanation Does Not Help, 19 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 407, 415 (1995) (concluding that a legal explanation did not help jurors disregard inadmissible evidence).
90
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sible evidence, however, present a more confusing picture than these
two studies suggest. Some studies replicate the “boomerang” effect
93
found in the early study involving insurance coverage in a tort case.
94
Others conclude that instructions to ignore have no effect. Others
93

See supra notes 79-85 and accompanying text (describing this experiment). For
other studies documenting the boomerang effect, see Russell D. Clark, III, The Role of
Censorship in Minority Influence, 24 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 331, 335-36 (1994) (supporting experimentally the proposition that attempts to censor a minority message will actually increase the influence of that minority); Michele Cox & Sarah Tanford, Effect of
Evidence and Instructions in Civil Trials: An Experimental Investigation of Rules of Admissibility, 4 SOC. BEHAV. 31, 46 (1989) (demonstrating that for “limited use evidence . . . the
limiting instruction [may] produce[] a ‘backfire’ effect, in that judgments were actually harsher with instructions than without”); Richard F. Rakos & Stephan Landsman,
Researching the Hearsay Rule: Emerging Findings, General Issues, and Future Directions, 76
MINN. L. REV. 655, 661-62 (1992) (finding that mock jurors disregarded specific hearsay despite being told to consider it, but with a limiting instruction); John C. Reinard &
Rodney A. Reynolds, The Effects of Inadmissible Testimony Objections and Rulings on Jury
Decisions, 15 J. AM. FORENSIC ASS’N 91, 98 (1978) (finding that jurors only considered
the inadmissible testimony when an objection was made, regardless of whether it was
sustained or not); Sarah Tanford & Michele Cox, The Effects of Impeachment Evidence and
Limiting Instructions on Individual and Group Decision Making, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
477, 484-85 (1987) (noting that limiting instructions directing jurors not to consider a
past perjury conviction when assigning blame actually resulted in more assignment of
blame than when no limiting instruction was given).
94
See, e.g., A.N. Doob & H.M. Kirshenbaum, Some Empirical Evidence on the Effects of
S. 12 of the Canada Evidence Act upon an Accused, 15 CRIM. L.Q. 88, 94-95 (1972) (finding
that the judge’s instructions to limit the use of previous conviction evidence “had no
effect whatsoever on the decisions of the [test] subjects”); Edith Greene & Mary
Dodge, The Influence of Prior Record Evidence on Juror Decision Making, 19 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 67, 73 (1995) (“Apparently, jurors’ use of information about a defendant’s legal history was not affected by instructions on the appropriate use of that information.”); Edith Greene & Elizabeth Loftus, When Crimes Are Joined at Trial, 9 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 193, 203-04 (1985) (finding that a limiting instruction had no significant effect
on the jury, except to “lower [the] guiltiness rating on a lesser included offense”); Saul
M. Kassin & Lawrence S. Wrightsman, Coerced Confessions, Judicial Instruction, and Mock
Juror Verdicts, 11 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 489, 494-95 (1982) (“[T]he instruction manipulation had no effect on verdicts.”); Gregory E. Lenehan & Patrick O’Neill, Reactance and Conflict as Determinants of Judgment in a Mock Jury Experiment, 11 J. APPLIED SOC.
PSYCHOL. 231, 237 (1981) (finding that when the judge gave a limiting instruction on
evidence relating to an inconsequential witness, the limiting instruction had no effect);
Angela Paglia & Regina A. Schuller, Jurors’ Use of Hearsay Evidence: The Effects of Type and
Timing of Instructions, 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 501, 512 (1998) (finding only marginal
differences in results whether or not hearsay instructions were given); Stanley Sue,
Ronald E. Smith & Renee Gilbert, Biasing Effects of Pretrial Publicity on Judicial Decisions, 2
J. CRIM. JUST. 163, 168-70 (1973) (finding that the judge’s instruction to disregard pretrial publicity had no significant effect on whether mock jurors rendered a guilty verdict); Sarah Tanford & Michele Cox, Decision Processes in Civil Cases: The Impact of Impeachment Evidence on Liability and Credibility Judgments, 2 SOC. BEHAV. 165, 170 (1987)
(finding that instructions limiting the use of prior perjury convictions had no significant effect on the degree of responsibility assigned); Sarah Tanford & Steven Penrod,
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indicate that mock jurors might have some ability to ignore inadmissi95
Still others indicate that mock jurors can comble information.
96
pletely ignore information deemed inadmissible. Finally, some even
Biases in Trials Involving Defendants Charged with Multiple Offenses, 12 J. APPLIED SOC.
PSYCHOL. 453, 462, 465 (1982) (indicating that an “instruction was partially effective,
since there were no differences between joined (with instructions) and single conditions”); William C. Thompson, Geoffrey T. Fong & D.L. Rosenhan, Inadmissible Evidence
and Juror Verdicts, 40 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 453, 457 (1981) (finding no effect from the judge’s instructions limiting either proacquittal or proconviction evidence); Rosell L. Wissler & Michael J. Saks, On the Inefficacy of Limiting Instructions:
When Jurors Use Prior Conviction Evidence to Decide on Guilt, 9 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 37, 4344 (1985) (finding that, despite an instruction to limit the use of a prior conviction
only to assess credibility, “credibility judgments were unaffected by [the] prior conviction condition”).
95
See W.R. Cornish & A.P. Sealy, Juries and the Rules of Evidence, 1973 CRIM. L. REV.
208, 222 (“Contrary to common supposition, juries give real weight to an instruction to
disregard relevant previous record wrongly admitted.”); Steven Fein, Allison L.
McCloskey & Thomas M. Tomlinson, Can the Jury Disregard That Information? The Use of
Suspicion to Reduce the Prejudicial Effects of Pretrial Publicity and Inadmissible Testimony, 23
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1215, 1223 (1997) (suggesting that jurors given
reason to be suspicious of inadmissible evidence will discount it); Jonathan L. Freedman, Christiane K. Martin & Victor L. Mota, Pretrial Publicity: Effects of Admonition and
Expressing Pretrial Opinions, 3 LEGAL & CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 255, 260-61 (1998)
(finding that an admonition not to base the decision on outside facts or discussion had
a significant effect on jurors’ willingness to find guilt); Kassin & Sommers, supra note
86, at 1049 (finding that jurors considered evidence that was ruled inadmissible on due
process grounds, but did not consider the same evidence that was ruled inadmissible
on reliability grounds); Jeffrey Kerwin & David R. Shaffer, Mock Jurors Versus Mock Juries:
The Role of Deliberations in Reactions to Inadmissible Testimony, 20 PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 153, 158 (1994) (finding that jurors are more likely to follow the
judge’s instruction when meeting as a jury than when simply voting for guilt or innocence on their own); Kamala London & Narina Nunez, The Effect of Jury Deliberations on
Jurors’ Propensity to Disregard Inadmissible Evidence, 85 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 932, 934, 936
(2000) (finding that a significant percentage of jurors who heard a due process limiting instruction changed their minds from guilty to not guilty during deliberations);
Pickel, supra note 92, at 414, 418 (finding that inadmissible evidence was more likely to
not be considered when no explanation was given for the limiting instruction, rather
than when the judge explained the reason); Sarah Tanford, Steven Penrod & Rebecca
Collins, Decision Making in Joined Criminal Trials: The Influence of Charge Similarity, Evidence Similarity, and Limiting Instructions, 9 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 319, 328-29 (1985)
(finding that instructions designed to eliminate prejudice with regard to joined
charges had a significant effect on jurors’ results); Carol M. Werner, Dorothy K. Kagehiro & Michael J. Strube, Conviction Proneness and the Authoritarian Juror: Inability to Disregard Information or Attitudinal Bias?, 67 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 629, 631-32 (1982) (finding that less authoritarian people were less likely to use inadmissible evidence to
convict the accused).
96
See Cox & Tanford, supra note 93, at 38-39 (“[T]he curative instruction appears
to alleviate the harm produced by the introduction of inadmissible evidence.”);
Monique A. Fleming, Duane T. Wegener & Richard E. Petty, Procedural and Legal Motivations to Correct for Perceived Judicial Biases, 35 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 186, 194-
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show that mock jurors overcompensate in reaction to inadmissible
evidence; that is, those exposed to the inadmissible information and
told to disregard it make decisions that are even more favorable to the
party that requested the instruction to disregard than the subjects who
97
were not exposed to the inadmissible information.
Even the mechanisms that might underlie these effects are in dispute. Some studies suggest that providing a reason why the evidence
98
99
is inadmissible is helpful, while others reveal this to be useless.
Similarly, some indicate that deliberation enhances the effectiveness
100
of instructions to ignore, but others suggest that deliberations make
101
things worse.
Can any generalizations be safely made? First, when people attempt to ignore inadmissible information of which they are aware in
making decisions or arriving at judgments about other people, they
102
frequently will be unsuccessful.
Second, such attempts are more

96 (1999) (suggesting that even if jurors do not change their private perceptions upon
hearing evidence is inadmissible, they do change how they vote).
97
See, e.g., Evelyn Goldstein Schaefer & Kristine L. Hansen, Similar Fact Evidence
and Limited Use Instructions: An Empirical Investigation, 14 CRIM. L.J. 157, 170 (1990)
(finding that receiving a limited use instruction greatly reduced the likelihood that a
juror would vote to convict); Samuel R. Sommers & Saul M. Kassin, On the Many Impacts
of Inadmissible Testimony: Selective Compliance, Need for Cognition, and the Overcorrection
Bias, 27 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1368, 1372-73 (2001) (finding that jurors
with a high need for cognition were significantly more likely to exhibit bias overcorrection than were jurors with a lower need for cognition); Tanford & Cox, supra note 93,
at 484 (finding that jurors who received character evidence of honesty, along with instructions to limit the use of a past perjury conviction, convicted the suspect at a far
lower rate than those who were not informed of the perjury conviction).
98
See Kassin & Sommers, supra note 86, at 1046-47 (providing an explanation for
why the inadmissible evidence facilitated mock jurors’ ability to ignore the evidence).
99
See Pickel, supra note 92, at 414 (finding that an explanation of why evidence
should be inadmissible had a significantly worse effect than providing no explanation
at all).
100
See Kerwin & Shaffer, supra note 95, at 158 (finding that deliberating juries were
more able to follow instructions and disregard inadmissible evidence than individual
jurors); London & Nunez, supra note 95, at 936 (same).
101
See Valerie P. Hans & Anthony N. Doob, Section 12 of the Canada Evidence Act and
the Deliberations of Simulated Juries, 18 CRIM. L.Q. 235, 243 (1975) (finding that deliberation increased the effect of inadmissible evidence on verdicts).
102
See Wegner, Schneider, Carter & White, supra note 49, at 6 (concluding that
“conscious thought suppression is not a cognitive transformation that people perform
with great facility”); see also id. (citing Donald V. McGranahan, A Critical and Experimental Study of Repression, 35 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 212 (1940), among other studies, for the proposition that even the threat of electric shocks did not deter subjects
from making forbidden color associations with stimulus words).
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likely to be successful (a) if the inadmissible information is not
103
needed to arrive at a sound decision; (b) if the inadmissible infor104
mation is not highly salient or emotionally charged; (c) if the decision maker is not simultaneously subjected to heavy extraneous cogni105
or, most importantly, (d) if the credibility of the
tive load;
inadmissible information sought to be ignored is destroyed or at least
106
called into question.
Finally, attempting to ignore inadmissible information might backfire or rebound, with the paradoxical result that
the inadmissible information becomes more influential than it would
107
have been in the absence of such an attempt.

103

See Stanley Sue, Ronald E. Smith & Cathy Caldwell, Effects of Inadmissible Evidence
on the Decisions of Simulated Jurors: A Moral Dilemma, 3 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 345, 351
(1973) (concluding that where the evidence was weak, an inadmissible inculpatory
tape recording biased jurors and the judge’s admonishment to disregard it was ineffective, but when the evidence against the defendant was strong, the inadmissible inculpatory tape recording had no effect on the verdict, regardless of what the judge did).
104
See, e.g., Kari Edwards & Tamara S. Bryan, Judgmental Biases Produced by Instructions to Disregard: The (Paradoxical) Case of Emotional Information, 23 PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 849, 856 (1997) (“[I]t is the capacity of information to elicit emotion
that renders it particularly difficult to ignore in the context of making judgments.”).
105
See, e.g., Wegner, supra note 44, at 35 (arguing that “mental control exerted
during mental load will often produce ironic effects, resulting in mental states that go
beyond ‘no change’ to become the opposite of what is desired”); Daniel M. Wegner,
Ralph Erber & Sophia Zanakos, Ironic Processes in the Mental Control of Mood and MoodRelated Thought, 65 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1093, 1101 (1993) (concluding
that subjects failed mental control tasks when they were assigned other mental tasks to
perform simultaneously).
106
See, e.g., Fein, McCloskey & Tomlinson, supra note 95, at 1223 (reporting that
exposure to incriminating information in the form of either pretrial publicity or inadmissible testimony negatively influenced individuals’ judgments about the defendant
regardless of whether the subjects were instructed to disregard the information, but
further reporting that creating suspicion about the motives underlying the disclosure
of the incriminating information mitigated or eliminated its impact). But see Fleming,
Wegener & Petty, supra note 96, at 197 (suggesting that concerns about procedural unfairness can influence decision makers to disregard information even at the cost of diminishing accuracy).
107
Although some studies find this effect, others do not. Compare Broeder, supra
note 79, at 754 (finding such an effect), and Sharon Wolf & David A. Montgomery, Effects of Inadmissible Evidence and Level of Judicial Admonishment to Disregard on the Judgments
of Mock Jurors, 7 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 205, 216 (1977) (same), with Sue, Smith &
Caldwell, supra note 103, at 350-51 (not finding such an effect).
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II. THE STUDY
A. Introduction
Previous studies shed light on juror decision making, but what
about judges? Without denigrating the important role that jurors play
in the legal system, we have argued previously that “judges are much
108
After all, about one-third of all civil
more important than juries.”
109
trials are bench trials, and judges “determine the outcome of
roughly seven times as many cases as juries by ruling on dispositive
motions, and they often play an active role in settling cases. Even in
110
those cases that juries decide, judges preside.”
For several reasons, judges might be better able than jurors to disregard inadmissible information. Judges are generally better educated than jurors, and thus might have superior abilities to perform
this difficult cognitive task. Moreover, judges have legal training that
probably makes them more likely than jurors to appreciate the purpose, importance, and desirability of the exclusionary rules. For
judges, exclusionary rules are also apt to present a less jarring infringement on sensible decision making. Finally, judges have substantial experience making legal decisions. Judges might thus be better
able to compartmentalize admissible evidence from inadmissible evidence and to limit their decisions to the contents of the formal re111
cord.
108

Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Judicial Mind,
86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 781 (2001).
109
Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Realities, 88 CORNELL L.
REV. 119, 143-44 (2002); see also LEONIDAS RALPH MECHAM, 2003 JUDICIAL BUSINESS:
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 162-64 tbl.C-7 (2003) (reporting 2603 civil jury trials and 3227 civil nonjury trials during the twelve-month period ending September 30,
2003), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2003/contents.html; Kevin M.
Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or Judge: Transcending Empiricism, 77
CORNELL L. REV. 1124, 1127 n.7 (1992) (noting two surveys where 55.5% of federal
civil trials and about 96% of state civil trials were judge trials).
110
Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, supra note 108, at 781 (footnotes omitted).
111
A number of psychology studies have examined the strategies necessary to exclude undesirable thoughts, such as those regarding impermissible evidence, from the
decision-making process. See Anita E. Kelley & Jeffrey H. Kahn, Effects of Suppression of
Personal Intrusive Thoughts, 66 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 998, 1004 (1994) (suggesting that people who are experienced in suppressing intrusive thoughts may be able
to do so by tapping into a network of effective distractors allowing them to avoid the
rebound effect after the suppression period); see also Richard M. Wenzlaff & Danielle
E. Bates, The Relative Efficacy of Concentration and Suppression Strategies of Mental Control,
26 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1200, 1210-11 (2000) (“[A] positive mental
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On the other hand, judges might not perform better than jurors—
and might even perform worse—for several reasons. Judges are likely
to be exposed to significantly more inadmissible information than jurors, in particular, information that jurors never hear or see. Additionally, judges might be confident that they can disregard inadmissi112
Because of this, they may be disinclined to
ble information.
undertake the extra effort necessary to avoid coming into contact with
inadmissible evidence and are therefore particularly susceptible to
113
“mental contamination.” Finally, most trial judges act alone. Often,
they have little, if any, opportunity for group deliberation with their
peers. This kind of deliberation is the hallmark of the jury decisionmaking process, and though the evidence is mixed, some studies do
suggest that deliberations can improve jurors’ ability to disregard in114
Thus, even if judges perform as well as or
admissible information.
115
better than jurors, they may not perform as well as juries.
We set out to assess these competing claims empirically. Despite
the dozens of prior studies on mock jurors, the ability of judges to disregard inadmissible evidence has been assessed in only one prior ex116
perimental study. This study showed that judges were unable to disregard evidence that a tort defendant had undertaken subsequent
remedial measures, even when told that the previously assigned judge
had ruled the evidence of those measures inadmissible. The authors
also found that the influence of the inadmissible evidence on judges

control strategy emphasizing the pursuit of desirable thoughts is preferable to the tactic of suppressing undesirable material.”).
112
See, e.g., Letter to the Editor, 36 HARV. L. REV. 193, 193 (1922) (“[W]e, the
judges (of superior mentality) are able to discern and segregate those matters by which
you, the jurors, might be led astray or biased.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
113
See supra Part I.C.
114
See Kerwin & Shaffer, supra note 95, at 160 (reporting results suggesting that
“deliberating juries were indeed less likely than individual jurors to recommend a verdict that was tainted by testimony they had been instructed to ignore.”); id. at 161
(“[A] generalization to juries based on the behavior of mock jurors can be a rather
perilous one.”).
115
See JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS: WHY THE MANY ARE SMARTER
THAN THE FEW AND HOW COLLECTIVE WISDOM SHAPES BUSINESS, ECONOMIES,
SOCIETIES, AND NATIONS 183-84 (2004) (noting Chandra Nemeth’s studies of mock
juries as proof that “the presence of a minority viewpoint . . . makes a group’s decisions
more nuanced and its decision-making process more rigorous,” even when the viewpoint is “ill conceived”).
116
See generally Landsman & Rakos, supra note 78 (examining reactions of judges
and mock jurors to biasing information in a hypothetical case).
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was comparable to its effect on a group of jury-eligible adults. While
suggestive, the study presented only a single type of inadmissible evidence. Furthermore, to facilitate the comparison between lay persons
and judges, the authors did not have the judges actually rule the evidence inadmissible. Normally, judges make their own rulings as to
admissibility. Given the role that psychological reactance is thought to
118
play in the evaluation of inadmissible evidence, this could have exaggerated the influence of the inadmissible evidence on judges.
Hence, like that study’s authors, we regard it as helpful, but preliminary. We undertook a more detailed assessment.
B. The Participating Judges
We recruited a total of 265 sitting judges attending five judicial
education conferences to participate in our study: 105 state trial court
119
judges from Maricopa County, Arizona, 62 federal magistrate judges
117

See id. at 125 (“[J]udges and jurors in civil cases react similarly when exposed to
material that is subsequently ruled inadmissible—their perceptions of central trial issues are altered.”).
118
See supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of psychological reactance on evidentiary considerations).
119
Of the 105 judges in Maricopa County, 70 were superior court judges, 25 were
court commissioners, one was an appellate judge, and two were administrative law
judges.
The superior court judges from Maricopa County are the principal trial court
judges in the county. They generally rotate through several departments, including
the civil, criminal, family, probate, and juvenile departments. In some instances, however, the judges might remain in a department for longer periods of time. In particular, the need for family court judges allows judges who want to adjudicate family cases
to volunteer for this assignment indefinitely. Thus, although most of the superior
court judges in our study have experience in multiple areas, twelve of these judges reported that they had presided exclusively over family court matters.
The Maricopa County Superior Court judges are appointed for fixed, renewable
terms through a merit selection process mandated by the Arizona Constitution. ARIZ.
CONST., art. 6, § 37 (amended 1974 and 1992). To obtain appointment to the bench,
prospective judges are considered by a judicial nominating commission. Id. § 37, cl. B.
The nominating commission recommends at least three candidates to the governor,
who then appoints the judges for fixed terms. Id. § 37, cl. B, C. Appointments are
based primarily on merit. See id. § 37, cl. C (“In making the appointment, the governor
shall consider the diversity of the state’s population for an appellate court appointment and the diversity of the county’s population for a trial court appointment, however the primary consideration shall be merit.”). For a more detailed explanation of
the process, see Ariz. Supreme Court, Merit Selection in Arizona, at http://
www.supreme.state.az.us/hr/meritpage.htm (last modified Sept. 25, 2003).
Like the superior court judges, the Maricopa County commissioners are also appointed through a merit selection process. See Superior Court of Ariz., Maricopa
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attending national workshops in either San Diego or Minneapolis,
26 federal district judges attending a national workshop in Philadel121
phia, and 71 trial court judges from a large urban trial court.
The judges in our sample share important characteristics. All of
the judges participating in this study were appointed, and all function
essentially as trial court judges who manage cases, facilitate settlement,
hear motions, and preside over trials. The principal difference among
the judges is that the federal magistrates conduct trials only in civil
cases and misdemeanor criminal cases, and focus most of their attention on pretrial matters, while the federal district judges and the
judges from Maricopa County and the urban jurisdiction are responsible collectively for a slightly broader range of civil and criminal matters.
County, Judge Information: Superior Court Commissioners, at http://www.superiorcourt.
maricopa.gov/judicialbios/judiciallist.asp?title=2 (last visited Mar. 7, 2005) (“Commissioners are appointed by the Court’s Presiding Judge from attorneys who apply and are
recommended by a selection committee made up of judges, lawyers and others.”). The
commissioners function much like the magistrate judges in the federal district courts,
performing a subset of the functions of the superior court judges. See id. (“Commissioners handle specific assigned cases and uncontested matters.”); see also Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Frequently Asked Questions, at http://www.uscourts.gov/
faq.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2005) (“A U.S. magistrate judge . . . exercise[s] jurisdiction over matters assigned by statute as well as those delegated by the district judges.”).
120
We described federal magistrate judges at some length in our prior article on
judicial decision making. See Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, supra note 108, at 784-85
(describing the function and selection of federal magistrate judges). Congress created
the office of the federal magistrate judge in 1968. Federal Magistrates Act, Pub. L. No.
90-578, 82 Stat. 1107 (1968) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 631-639 (2000 &
Supp. 2001)). Federal magistrate judges perform a variety of functions, including making preliminary rulings in civil and criminal cases and organizing settlement conferences. These judges can also preside over civil trials with the litigants’ consent. Between September 2002 and September 2003, federal magistrate judges handled
315,455 preliminary criminal proceedings, 82,138 civil pretrial conferences, and entered final judgment in 13,811 cases litigated by civil consent. MECHAM, supra note
109, at 38-39 tbl.S-17. Federal magistrate judges apply for the position and are selected
by “merit selection panels” charged with “identifying and recommending persons who
are best qualified to fill such positions.” 28 U.S.C. § 631(b)(5) (2000 & Supp. 2001).
Based on these recommendations, the district judges in the relevant district vote for
their preferred applicant. Id. § 631(a). The magistrates serve renewable eight-year
terms. Id. § 631(e).
121
This group of judges participated in the study only on the condition that we
not identify the jurisdiction. We can roughly identify the characteristics of these
judges, however. All are from a single jurisdiction. They are similar to the judges from
Maricopa County (although they are not from Arizona). That is, these judges are also
the principal trial court judges in their jurisdiction, they are appointed through a merit
selection procedure, they serve for renewable fixed terms, and they rotate through
multiple departments within their jurisdiction.
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We did not ask the judges to identify themselves by name, but we
did ask them to identify their gender and number of years of experi122
Overall, approximately one-third of the judges
ence on the bench.
in our sample are women (30.6% in San Diego, 24.0% in Minneapolis,
21.6% in Maricopa County, 14.8% among the federal district judges,
and 44.2% in the urban jurisdiction). The judges also have a great
deal of judicial experience. On average, the federal magistrate judges
attending the San Diego conference had 9.2 years of experience at the
time of the conference, the magistrate judges in Minneapolis had 14.2
years of experience, the Maricopa County judges had 7.2 years of experience, the federal district judges had 11.2 years of experience as
federal district judges (13.5 years of judicial experience in total, including the prior experience of the 6 judges who reported that they
had served as state judges before their appointment to the federal
bench), and the urban jurisdiction judges had 9.2 years of experience
on the bench.
C. The Procedure
We collected the data reported in this study at five different judicial educational conferences: two for federal magistrate judges, one
for federal district judges, and one each for the Maricopa County and
urban jurisdiction judges. The Federal Judicial Center (FJC) hosted
the conference for federal district judges in Philadelphia in April 2004
and the two conferences for federal magistrate judges, one in San Di123
At
ego in April 2002 and another in Minneapolis in June 2002.
these three conferences, we presented an optional program on the
“Psychology of Judging,” which 36 judges in San Diego, 26 judges in
Minneapolis, and 28 judges in Philadelphia elected to attend.
We collected data from the Maricopa County judges and the
judges from the urban jurisdiction at their respective annual continuing education conferences. At both of these conferences, the three of
us presented a program on the “Psychology of Judging.” The great
majority of the judges in each of these jurisdictions attended these
conferences. Further, these two conferences did not include any op122

Knowing that we would have a mixed group of judges in Maricopa County, we
asked the judges in this group to identify their title as well. See supra note 119 (describing the differing roles and functions of Maricopa County Superior Court judges and
commissioners).
123
Some of these judges had participated in our earlier study of magistrate judges.
Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, supra note 108, at 785.
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tional sessions, so the judges did not self-select to attend our programs. In the case of the urban jurisdiction, all but a few of the judges
in the jurisdiction attended the conference and participated in our
study (the educational conference was described as mandatory by the
chief judge of this jurisdiction). In the case of Maricopa County, 85%
of the county’s superior court judges and 68% of the county’s com124
missioners participated.
At all of the conferences, we employed similar methods. We distributed our questionnaires to the judges in person prior to our presentation. We asked the judges to read and respond to each of the
questions and to do so independently. At all five conferences, the
judges appeared to take the questionnaires seriously. The rooms were
silent during the administration of the questionnaires.
Because we did not ask the judges to identify themselves, all responses were anonymous. We also informed the judges that partici125
pation in the survey was entirely voluntary.
The final page of the
questionnaires gave the judges the opportunity to limit the use of
their answers to discussion during their particular conference,
thereby excluding them from discussion in other contexts and from
use in any publication. One magistrate judge in San Diego, one magistrate judge in Minneapolis, one federal district judge, and two
judges in the urban jurisdiction exercised this option. The questionnaires completed by judges who exercised this option are not included in our analysis.
D. The Materials
We gave each participating judge a questionnaire that included
between four and seven scenarios, only some of which dealt with the

124

See Superior Court of Ariz., Maricopa County, Superior Court Judges, at
http://www.superiorcourt.maricopa.gov/judicialbios/index.asp (last visited Mar. 7,
2005) (providing links to the number of superior court judgeships and commissioner
positions in the jurisdiction, from which we calculated the percentage of judges and
commissioners in attendance).
125
The title page to the questionnaire consisted of the name of the conference,
city, and date, followed by the paragraph below:
Many of the points discussed by this panel are best understood if experienced directly. We therefore ask that before the session starts, you read and
respond to each of the questions enclosed in the survey (although doing so is
voluntary, of course). Please do so independently and please do not discuss the
surveys with others while you are responding to the questions. We shall collect these
surveys before the discussion and present the results during the panel session.
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126

subject of this Article.
The judges evaluated scenarios designed to
assess their ability to disregard the following types of inadmissible evi127
dence:
1) settlement demands made during a pretrial conference;
2) information protected by the attorney-client privilege and reviewed in camera by the judge;
3) inadmissible sexual history in a criminal case involving an alleged sexual assault;
4) a presumptively inadmissible criminal record in a civil case;
5) information obtained by the prosecution from a criminal defendant which the government had agreed not to use at sentencing
under a “cooperation agreement”;
6) the outcome of a search involving a probable cause determination; and
7) a criminal confession obtained during an interrogation conducted after the defendant had invoked his right to counsel.
To assess the judges’ ability to disregard this information, we used
128
a “between groups” or “between subjects” experimental design.
That is, we created two versions of each scenario, a “control” version
and one or more “suppression” versions. In the control version, we
126

The materials used at each of the four sessions varied. The questionnaires for
all of the groups of federal magistrate judges included four different hypotheticals for
the judges to evaluate. The questionnaires for the federal district judges included five
scenarios. The trial judges from the anonymous urban jurisdiction responded to seven
different scenarios. Finally, each of the questionnaires administered to the Maricopa
County judges included four out of five different scenarios (two scenarios were each
given to one-half of the judges). We did not vary the order in which the materials were
presented within any single educational conference.
127
Both groups of the federal magistrate judges and judges in the urban jurisdiction also received other scenarios not reported here. The federal magistrates in San
Diego received two other questions (involving attractiveness and sentencing, and an
assessment of the admissibility of a coerced confession); the federal magistrate judges
in Minneapolis received one other question (involving subsequent remedial measures); and judges in the urban jurisdiction received four other questions (involving
attractiveness and sentencing, contrast effects in witness credibility, conjunctive effects
in a criminal case, and presentation format of DNA evidence).
128
See DAVID W. MARTIN, DOING PSYCHOLOGY EXPERIMENTS 150-53, 172 (6th ed.
2004) (explaining that a between-subjects experiment can be advantageous because
“participants are exposed to only one level of the independent variable, so the other
levels cannot affect the participants’ behavior”); JOHN J. SHAUGHNESSY & EUGENE B.
ZECHMEISTER, RESEARCH METHODS IN PSYCHOLOGY 176-85 (3d ed. 1994) (describing
the elements of a successful experiment, and noting that “[t]he primary reason that
experiments are so effective for testing hypotheses is that they allow researchers to exercise a relatively high level of control”).
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provided a description of the scenario and then asked the judge to
make a substantive ruling (i.e., civil liability, criminal liability, or
damages). In the suppression version, we provided the same description of the scenario, but we added inadmissible information for the
judge to review before we asked the judge to make the very same substantive ruling. We then compared the rulings made by the judges in
the control version of each scenario to the suppression version(s).
Because the only thing we varied between the control and suppression conditions was the presence of the inadmissible information—
that is, because we controlled for all other factors that might influence the judges’ decision making—we can attribute any differences
in the rulings between the groups to the presence of that informa129
In other words, the inadmissible information is our “indetion.
130
pendent variable” and the substantive decision is our “dependent
131
variable.”

129

See SHAUGHNESSY & ZECHMEISTER, supra note 128, at 182 (explaining that in a
random groups design, “if the groups perform differently, it is presumed that the independent variable is responsible”).
130
See id. at 178 (describing independent variables as “[t]he factors that the researcher controls or manipulates”).
131
See id. (describing dependent variables as “[t]he measures that are used to assess the effect (if any) of the independent variables”).
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Table 1 identifies the scenarios that each group of judges received:
132

Table 1: Distribution of the Seven Scenarios

Scenario
Group

Settlement

A-C
Privilege

Sexual
History

Prior

Co-op

Search

Crim.

Convic-

Agree-

Out-

Confes-

tion

ment

come

sion

Fed. Mag.
Judges:

Low

All

San Diego
Fed. Mag.
Judges:

All,
High

All

Version

Minneapolis

2

Maricopa

High

County

/ Half

All,
Half

Version

Fed. Dist.

Jurisdiction

132

All

All

Judges
Urban

All

2

Low

All,

All,

Version

Version

1

1

The settlement scenario had two versions, as described below. All of the judges
received one of these, except that only half of the Maricopa County judges received
this item. The half of the Maricopa County judges that did not receive this scenario
received the attorney-client privilege scenario instead. The first version of the sexual
history problem, run in the urban jurisdiction, did not provide a meaningful test of
our hypothesis, and hence was changed before being run again in Maricopa County.
Specifically, the first version produced an extremely low conviction rate: 12.1%, or 4
out of 33 in the control conviction and 3% (1 out of 33) in the suppression condition.
Given that the suppressed evidence was intended to facilitate an acquittal, the low conviction rates made it impossible to discern any effect of the suppressed evidence. The
revisions added evidence intended to facilitate convictions: the victim reported the
incident immediately, the victim had suffered observable bruises consistent with forcible intercourse, and the victim suffered emotional consequences from the encounter.
The prior search problem was also rewritten because of an ambiguity in the question
that was remedied for the Minneapolis judges. Copies of all scenarios are described
below and full versions are included in their original form in the Appendix.
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III. THE RESULTS
A. Anchoring and Settlement Talks
Our first scenario explores whether judges who encounter inadmissible information during a pretrial settlement conference are able
133
to disregard it at trial. Both the Federal Rules of Evidence and state
134
evidence rules or codes prohibit the introduction of “conduct or
135
statements made in compromise negotiations” into evidence at trial.
The rules exclude this information primarily for extrinsic reasons,
136
namely “to foster ‘complete candor’ between parties” and thereby
137
facilitate settlement.
We sought to determine whether judges who encounter inadmissible information during a settlement conference might nonetheless
be influenced by it when ruling at trial. In particular, judges might be
influenced by the offers or demands parties make during settlement
138
talks due to a phenomenon called “anchoring.”
Anchoring operates in the following way. When people estimate
an uncertain numeric value, they commonly rely on any numeric
133

FED. R. EVID. 408.
E.g., ARIZ. R. EVID. 408.
135
In full, Rule 408 of both the Federal Rules and the Arizona Rules of Evidence
provides as follows:
Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2) accepting or offering or promising to accept, a valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise a claim which was disputed as to either validity or amount, is not admissible to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim
or its amount. Evidence of conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations is likewise not admissible. This rule does not require the exclusion of
any evidence otherwise discoverable merely because it is presented in the
course of compromise negotiations. This rule also does not require exclusion
when the evidence is offered for another purpose, such as proving bias or
prejudice of a witness, negativing a contention of undue delay, or proving an
effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution.
Id. The rule governing the urban jurisdiction is similar.
136
Hernandez v. State, 52 P.3d 765, 768 (Ariz. 2002) (en banc) (citing 23 CHARLES
ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 5314, at
286 (1980)).
137
See supra note 10 (giving reasons for excluding evidence of settlement offers);
see also FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee’s note (describing the purpose of the rule
as “freedom of communication with respect to compromise”). For a statement of the
policy favoring settlement in our civil justice system, see Stephen McG. Bundy, The Policy in Favor of Settlement in an Adversary System, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (1992).
138
See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics
and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124, 1128-30 (1974) (describing anchoring).
134

2005]

CAN JUDGES IGNORE INADMISSIBLE INFORMATION?

1287

139

value that happens to be available to them.
The initial value pro140
Across
vides a starting point that “anchors” the estimation process.
dozens of studies, psychologists have found that the adjustment from
the anchor is inadequate, thereby giving the anchor greater influence
141
Even irreleon the estimated numerical value than it should have.
vant or ridiculous anchors that bear no relationship to the actual nu142
merical value can influence estimates.
Legal scholars have expressed concerns about anchoring in the
143
legal system.
In particular, scholars have worried about the pernicious effects that anchors might have on civil damage awards, especially “pain and suffering” damages and punitive damages. Indeed,
several studies have demonstrated that plaintiffs’ requests for dam144
ages—even absurdly high requests —influence the amounts that
145
mock jurors award.
Some scholars have argued that the influence of anchors calls for
an expansion of the judicial role—and concomitant contraction of the
146
jury’s role—in the damage assessment process.
Such claims, of
course, assume that judges are largely immune from the effects of an-

139

See id. at 1128 (showing that providing starting points to subjects influences
their estimates).
140
Id.
141
See generally Nicholas Epley & Thomas Gilovich, Putting Adjustment Back in the
Anchoring and Adjustment Heuristic: Differential Processing of Self-Generated and Experimenter-Provided Anchors, 12 PSYCHOL. SCI. 391 (2001); Fritz Strack & Thomas Mussweiler, Explaining the Enigmatic Anchoring Effect: Mechanisms of Selective Accessibility, 73 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 437 (1997).
142
In one study, for example, people gave higher estimates for the mean daytime
temperature in downtown San Francisco if they were first asked whether that mean
temperature was greater than 558° Fahrenheit. See SCOTT PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 146 (1993) (summarizing a 1984 study conducted by
George Quattrone and his colleagues).
143
See Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, supra note 108, at 789-90 (discussing anchoring in civil damage awards).
144
See, e.g., Gretchen B. Chapman & Brian H. Bornstein, The More You Ask for, the
More You Get: Anchoring in Personal Injury Verdicts, 10 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 519,
525-26 (1996) (finding in a case involving fairly modest damages that mock jurors were
still influenced by a plaintiff’s lawyer’s request for $1 billion).
145
See Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, supra note 108, at 789-90 (listing several
such studies).
146
See Cass R. Sunstein, Daniel Kahneman, David Schkade & Ilana Ritov, Predictably
Incoherent Judgments, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1153, 1182 (2002) (“A more promising strategy
for reducing incoherence would be to give relatively greater power to the reviewing
court and relatively less power to the jury. . . . [J]udges are in a better position to move
toward global coherence, or at least to avoid the worst anomalies.”).
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chors. Our prior research on judges makes us skeptical about this as147
sumption.
1. Anchoring and Settlement Talks: The Scenario
To assess whether judges might be influenced by anchors supplied
in settlement conferences, we created a scenario entitled “Assessment
148
149
In this scenario, the participating judges learn that
of Damages.”
they are presiding in a bench trial involving a suit arising from an
automobile accident. The plaintiff is a 31-year-old high school teacher
who lost his right arm after he was hit by a truck driven by one of the
defendant’s employees. Since the accident, the plaintiff has had problems at work; additionally, he can no longer play recreational softball
or even play catch with his son. He also endured a great deal of pain.
The defendant, a large package-delivery company, admits fault but
disputes the extent of plaintiff’s damages.
The materials state that at the request of the parties, the judges
agreed to preside over a settlement conference on the eve of trial. At
the conference, plaintiff’s counsel informed the judges that the plaintiff was eager to recover monetary damages from the defendant.
Judges assigned to the control conditions did not receive a specific
150
dollar request from plaintiff’s counsel, while judges assigned to the
two suppression conditions learn that the plaintiff had demanded ei147

In a prior article, we reported experimental evidence that judges, like mock
jurors, are susceptible to the effects of an irrelevant anchor. Guthrie, Rachlinski &
Wistrich, supra note 108, at 790-92.
148
Infra Appendix, pp. 1332-33.
149
We gave all of the judges except the federal district judges either the low- or the
high-anchor materials and their appropriately matched control conditions. The federal magistrate judges in San Diego reviewed the low-anchor materials while the federal magistrate judges in Minneapolis reviewed the high-anchor materials. The urban
jurisdiction judges reviewed the low-anchor materials and half of the Maricopa County
judges reviewed the high-anchor materials. Supra Table 1, p. 1285.
150
The two control conditions varied slightly from one another. In the control
condition matched with the low-anchor condition, the materials explained to the judge
that, “[d]uring the settlement conference, the plaintiff’s attorney confided in you that
his client could use the money and wanted to eliminate any possibility of an appeal.”
In the control condition matched with the high-anchor condition, the materials explained that, “[d]uring the settlement conference, the plaintiff’s attorney confided in
you that his client was intent upon collecting a significant monetary payment.” Note
that the relevant comparisons for our purposes are between the judges in the first control group vis-à-vis the low-anchor judges and between the judges in the second control
group vis-à-vis the high-anchor judges. We do not compare the control groups to one
another.
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ther $175,000 (low-anchor version) or $10,000,000 (high-anchor version) to settle the case.
The materials state that the settlement conference was unsuccessful, and so the case proceeded to trial. The materials reminded the
judges that “[t]he settlement discussions are, of course, not admissible
151
evidence at trial under Rule ___ of the ___ Rules of Evidence.”
Nonetheless, the settlement demands disclosed in settlement might
impermissibly anchor the judges’ determinations of pain and suffering
damages.
2. Anchoring and Settlement Talks: Results
Tables 2 and 3, below, present the results for this scenario. Both
the low anchor ($175,000) and the high anchor ($10,000,000) had a
significant impact on the pain and suffering damages awarded by the
judges. As each table demonstrates, the results were not the product
of a few extremely low or extremely high awards in the suppression
conditions; rather, the anchors shifted the whole distribution of
awards downwards (in the case of the low anchor) or upwards (in the
case of the high anchor).
The judges assigned to the low-anchor condition gave the plaintiff
a mean award of $612,000, while the judges assigned to the matched
control condition awarded nearly $1,400,000 on average. Thus, the
judges in the low-anchor condition gave the plaintiff a mean award
less than half the size of the mean award given by the judges in the
control condition. The difference between these two groups was sig152
nificant, using both a parametric and a more appropriate nonpara153
metric test.

151

Infra Appendix, p. 1332. The materials supplied the citation to the rule number for the relevant jurisdiction.
152
Throughout this paper, the term “significance” denotes only a statistical relationship.
153
Two-sample t(52) = 2.78, p < .01; Mann-Whitney U = 2270, p < .005. Throughout this paper, all t -tests were performed without assuming equal variances in the two
samples. The data are skewed positively, making the nonparametric test more reliable.
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Table 2: Low-Anchor Study: Means and Quartile Results
(in $1000s)
Condition (and n)

Mean

1st Quartile

Median

3d Quartile

Low Anchor (53)

612

250

500

750

Control-Low Anchor (47)

1396

366

600

1500

The judges assigned to the high-anchor condition awarded over
$2,200,000 on average, while judges assigned to the matched control
condition awarded $808,000 on average. Thus, the judges in the highanchor condition gave the plaintiff a mean award almost three times
the size of the award given by the judges in the control condition.
The difference between these two groups is also significant, using both
154
parametric and non-parametric tests.
Table 3: High-Anchor Study: Means and Quartile Results
(in $1000s)
Mean

1st Quartile

Median

3d Quartile

Control-High Anchor (37)

Condition (and n)

808

325

700

1000

High Anchor (38)

2210

575

1000

3000

We also attempted to assess the effects of gender, court (i.e., court
on which the judge sits), and experience on the awards. To do so, we
transformed the raw data to create a normal distribution and then
performed our analyses on the log-transformed data. For both the
low-anchor and high-anchor studies, we regressed the award on condition, gender, court, and an interaction term of condition with gender,
type, and experience. We found no significant main effects or interactions for gender or for court in either the low- or high-anchor scenarios. In the high-anchor condition, we observed a trend for female
judges to be less affected by the anchor, although this trend was not
155
significant. We also found that, among judges in the two conditions

154

Two-sample t(44) = 3.44, p < .005; Mann-Whitney U = 1086.5, p < .001.
The t -ratio of the coefficient for the interaction was 1.56, p = .12. Among
judges in the low-anchor condition, the correlation between experience and the log of
the award was .024, whereas among judges in the corresponding control condition, the
correlation was -.237. This difference produced the trend towards an interaction. Because the correlation between experience and awards was negative in the control condition, we cannot conclude that experience in any way mitigated the effect of the low anchor. Such an effect would have produced the opposite tendency (a positive
155
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testing for the effect of low anchors, more experienced judges tended
156
This effect did not interact significantly with condito award less.
157
tion. We did not observe any effect of experience on awards in the
two conditions testing for the effects of high anchors.
A comparison of Tables 2 and 3 suggests an unexpected trend for
the judges in the “no anchor” conditions in each study to have provided different results. Even though the scenarios were identical,
judges in the “no anchor” condition in the low-anchor study provided
a mean award of $1.396 million, whereas judges in the “no anchor”
condition in the high-anchor study provided a mean award of
158
$808,000. This apparent difference was not reliable, however.
3. Anchoring and Settlement Talks: Discussion
The anchors appear to have influenced the judges’ assessments of
the appropriate amount of damages to award. Relative to the judges
assigned to the control conditions, the high-anchor judges gave substantially higher awards and the low-anchor judges gave substantially
lower awards.
The anchors provided in this study—in contrast to the anchors
that psychologists typically provide in their studies of anchoring—are
at least arguably relevant to the judges’ assessment of damages. The
plaintiff’s lawyer disclosed valuable information to the judges about
159
Counsel may have made this dishis client’s sense of entitlement.
closure for strategic reasons, of course, but the disclosure was presumably grounded in some perceived reality and hence is correlated
with the harm his client believes he has suffered. Despite the anchor’s
conceivable relevance, however, the applicable evidentiary rules re-

correlation between experience and awards in the low-anchor condition such that the
awards among more experienced judges would have been similar in both conditions).
156
The t -ratio of the coefficient for experience was 2.04, p < .05.
157
The t -ratio of the coefficient for the interaction was 1.56, p = .12.
158
Two-sample t(63) = 1.97, p = .05; Mann-Whitney U = 2124.0, p = .25. An analysis
performed on the log transformation of the damage award also revealed no significant
difference between the two samples. Two-sample t(66) = 1.64, p = .11. Note that one
judge had awarded $0; this amount was adjusted to $1 before the log transformation of
the data so as to preserve this observation in the analysis.
159
See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee’s note (“The evidence is irrelevant, since the offer [to compromise] may be motivated by a desire for peace rather
than from any concession of weakness of position.”).
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quire the judges to disregard it. The materials explicitly reminded the
160
judges of this rule.
Nonetheless, the inadmissible information disclosed in the settlement talks appears to have influenced the judges exposed to it. Surreptitious reliance (even if it was unintentional) on information elicited during the settlement conference undermines the goals of Rule
408 and other rules like it. These prohibitions are designed to encourage parties to be open and candid; but to the extent the parties
fear that their discussions will be used against them later, they are
more likely to behave strategically in settlement talks and reach a bargaining impasse.
This study obviously has its limits. Anchoring may be a uniquely
powerful phenomenon; if so, other disclosures made during settlement conferences might have a lesser impact on judges. Moreover,
judges in actual cases would have much more information about the
parties and their dispute, so even if anchors are powerful, the effects
of anchors might be muted. Nevertheless, there are reasons to believe
that the results of this study are generalizable to the real world. The
damages demanded by a plaintiff are uniquely salient, so even under
circumstances where judges learn substantially more information
about the parties or are supplied with alternative anchors, judges are
161
likely to have difficulty disregarding this particular information.
Moreover, judges, like other decision makers, are most likely to rely
on cognitive shortcuts, such as anchoring, when they face time constraints that force them to process complex information quickly. Although judges certainly face time pressure in the courtroom, judges
also can delay their decisions in some circumstances so as to allow
themselves more time to think. As with all of our results, the data suggest potential obstacles to good decision making, more so than providing definitive evidence of poor decision making.
These results impart some lessons for litigants engaged in settlement talks in front of a judge. Despite the protection of evidentiary
restrictions, settlement discussions might affect how a judge thinks
about a case. This suggests that parties should be cautious about their
discussions, or that they should be strategic. A judge can facilitate the

160

See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
See Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, supra note 108, at 792-94 (discussing the
power of anchors in judicial decision making).
161
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candor that might be essential to settlement only by declining to sit as
the presiding judge should the case fail to settle.
These results underscore the importance of judicial recusal and
disqualification in maintaining the integrity of the legal system.
Judges who learn important facts, from the settlement process or from
pretrial rulings, should consider the potential influence of this information, especially in a bench trial or while ruling on dispositive motions. Although our work shows that judges sometimes display a remarkable ability to ignore inadmissible evidence, judges might not be
162
By and
able to discern which evidence they can reliably ignore.
large, the rules governing recusal and disqualification are generous in
facilitating judicial removal when even the appearance of impropriety
163
exists.
Pockets of law are not so solicitous of this concern, however. Notably, Justices on the United States Supreme Court commonly argue
that they have a “duty to sit” on a case that overrides ordinary con164
cerns of impropriety or bias. Similarly, decision makers in administrative agencies similarly cannot be disqualified from decisions absent
a showing by clear and convincing evidence that they have an “unal165
Our results suggest either that the law needs
terably closed mind.”
to be more vigorous in prescribing disqualification in these areas, or
that judges should be receptive to recusing themselves, and perhaps
even recuse themselves when they do not sense the influence of extraneous evidence.

162

See Kovacs v. Szentes, 33 A.2d 124, 125 (Conn. 1943) (“A judge has not such
control over his mental faculties that he can definitely determine whether or not inadmissible evidence he has heard will affect his mind in making his decision.”).
163
See John Leubsdorf, Theories of Judging and Judge Disqualification, 62 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 237, 238 (1987) (“Courts declare that impartiality is so important that a reasonable—albeit incorrect—appearance of bias compels recusal . . . .”); see also Debra Lyn
Bassett, Recusal and the Supreme Court, 56 HASTINGS L.J. (forthcoming 2005) (manuscript at 2, on file with authors) (“Avoiding the appearance of impropriety requires a
judge to withdraw from a case when the judge’s impartiality in a matter might reasonably be questioned.”).
164
See Bassett, supra note 163 (manuscript at 19-21) (reviewing the “duty to sit” in
the United States Supreme Court).
165
C & W Fish Co. v. Fox, 931 F.2d 1556, 1564 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (“[A]n individual
should be disqualified from rulemaking only when there has been a clear and convincing showing that the Department member has an unalterably closed mind on matters
critical to the disposition of the proceeding.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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B. Attorney-Client Privilege
Our second scenario explores the question of whether judges can
ignore highly relevant information protected by the attorney-client
166
The attorney-client privilege is premised on the assumpprivilege.
tion that clients will disclose critical information to their attorneys
only if they know that such disclosures will not come back to haunt
167
them. Because obtaining proper legal advice requires that clients be
able to relate this information to their attorneys, the privilege is cen168
tral to the administration of justice.
Nonetheless, we anticipated that the judges might have trouble
disregarding privileged information relevant to the merits of the case.
In particular, privileged information revealing that a client knows that
she is guilty or that she should lose a civil case might be especially difficult to disregard. Such information not only reveals the weaknesses
in the litigant’s case, but also undermines her credibility and suggests
that she might be abusing the justice system. It might be difficult to
disregard such information.
1. Attorney-Client Privilege: The Scenario
To assess whether judges are able to ignore disclosures protected
by the attorney-client privilege, we created and administered a sce169
In this scenario,
nario entitled “Evaluation of a Contract Dispute.”
170
the participating judges learn that they are presiding over a bench
trial involving a contract dispute between a freelance consultant
named Jones and a movie studio called SmithFilms.
The judges learn that the outcome of the dispute will turn on
whether they find that the studio offered Jones “producer credit”
166

Rule 501 of the Arizona Rules of Evidence and Arizona Statute section 12-2234
protect attorney-client communications. See ARIZ. R. EVID. 501 (regarding privileges
generally); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2234 (West 2003) (privileging communications
between lawyer and client in civil cases).
167
See, e.g., Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888) (stating that the privilege
“is founded upon the necessity, in the interest and administration of justice, of the aid
of persons having knowledge of the law and skilled in its practice, which assistance can
only be safely and readily availed of when free from the consequences or the apprehension of disclosure”).
168
Id.
169
Infra Appendix, pp. 1334-35.
170
We gave this scenario to all of the federal magistrate judges attending the San
Diego conference and half of the judges attending the Maricopa County conference.
Supra Table 1, p. 1285.
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when it retained him to work on a movie. The only writing in the case
consists of a short letter, signed both by Jones and the studio’s owner
(Smith), stating that “Jones will provide various services to SmithFilms,
that Jones will continue to be paid a monthly salary as an independent
contractor until the film is released, and that Jones will receive such
other consideration as was agreed upon by the parties during the pre171
signing breakfast.” Jones contends that Smith offered him producer
credit as part of the package, and he presents testimony from a waitress who stated that she thought she overheard the parties discussing
producer credit at their breakfast meeting. Unfortunately, Smith has
fallen ill and is in a coma, so the movie studio’s only viable defense is
to argue that Smith generally did not offer such credit.
In addition to learning this information, the judges assigned to
the suppression group were told that before they decided the merits,
they must resolve a discovery dispute. The materials state that the defendant filed a motion to compel production of an audiotaped conversation between Jones and his business attorney (not the attorney
172
The plaintiff argues that the
representing him in this litigation).
conversation is protected by the attorney-client privilege, but the defendant contends that Jones was seeking business advice, not legal ad173
vice, from this attorney.
The materials state that the “parties requested that you listen to
174
the audiotape in camera,” including the following excerpt from the
conversation:
Jones: I really needed this deal and I was afraid that asking for producer
credit might be a turn-off, so I got nervous and did not ask for it. But I
meant to. I need your legal opinion, Greg. Suppose that I send Smith a
letter now saying that I meant for producer credit to be part of the deal.
Would that be legally binding?
Gonzalez: No. If you and Smith did not agree on producer credit during breakfast, you don’t have a leg to stand on. A letter now won’t help.
175

Jones: Darn. That’s a shame.

171

Infra Appendix, p. 1334.
Infra Appendix, p. 1334.
173
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2234 (West 2003) (stating that the attorneyclient privilege is applicable only where the communication involves either the “providing [of] legal advice” or “obtaining information in order to” do so).
174
Infra Appendix, p. 1334.
175
Infra Appendix, p. 1334.
172
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The judges learn that “[t]he rest of the audiotape confirms that Gon176
zalez was functioning solely in a legal capacity.” The judges are then
177
asked to “rule on a motion to compel production of the audiotape.”
Thereafter, the materials return to the same script as in the control condition. Ultimately, the judges in both conditions are asked to
indicate whether they would rule for Jones (the plaintiff) or SmithFilms (the defendant) in this contract dispute.
2. Attorney-Client Privilege: The Results
The information protected by the attorney-client privilege had an
impact on the judges’ resolution of the merits. In the control condition, 55.6% (25 out of 45) of the judges found for the plaintiff. The
judges in the suppression condition were less hospitable to the plaintiff’s claim. Among those who ruled that the audiotape was privileged,
only 29.2% (7 out of 24) found for the plaintiff. The difference between the responses of the judges in these two groups was statistically
178
significant.
A substantial percentage of the judges (33.3%, or 12 out of 36)
granted the motion to compel production of the audiotape. Among
these judges, 25% (3 out of 12) found for the plaintiff. This percentage did not differ significantly from the percentage of judges who had
179
suppressed the audiotape (29.2%).
We also conducted additional analyses of demographic variables.
Using logistic regression on the verdict, we found no significant main
effects of gender or experience, or of the interaction of these two
variables with condition. We did, however, uncover a main effect for
court. In Maricopa County, 31.6% of the judges (12 out of 38) found
for the plaintiff, whereas 64.5% (20 out of 31) of the federal magis180
trate judges found for the plaintiff. This effect did not interact with
condition.

176
177
178
179
180

Infra Appendix, p. 1335.
Infra Appendix, p. 1335.
Fisher’s exact p < .05.
Fisher’s exact p > .5.
The t -ratio of the coefficient for court was 2.20, p < .05.
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3. Attorney-Client Privilege: Discussion
Exposure to the privileged information appears to have influenced the judges’ decisions. Although a majority of the judges who
had not seen the privileged materials ruled in favor of the plaintiff,
fewer than 30% of the judges who determined the materials were
privileged ruled the same way. Even though the judges themselves
ruled that the information was privileged, and therefore immune
from discovery, this information appears to have had a substantial impact on their assessments of civil liability.
The results of this study comport with the intuitions of at least
some of the judges in our study who wrote on the questionnaire that
they would recuse themselves in this situation. One judge even added
a line next to our available answers, wrote “recuse self” with an open
box next to it, and then checked the box! Although admittedly anecdotal, these responses suggest that at least some of the judges recognized that they would have a difficult time ignoring the privileged information at trial.
It is worth noting that a third of the judges in the suppression
condition granted the motion to compel production, even though the
conversation is probably best construed as privileged. One could argue that the crime-fraud exception to attorney-client privilege ap181
plies. That is, if the plaintiff had hired his business attorney for the
purpose of perpetrating a fraud, then his conversation would not be
privileged. But the context of the conversation suggests that the
plaintiff consulted his business attorney for purposes of obtaining legal advice, not for purposes of committing a fraud.
At the same time, it is likely that the plaintiff’s litigation attorney
would have reviewed the audiotape. Hence, the plaintiff’s attorney is
arguably pursuing a lawsuit that she knows lacks merit. This might
give rise to an ethics violation if the plaintiff’s attorney does not at182
tempt to withdraw. Neither the rules against frivolous litigation nor
the ethics rules, however, create an exception to the attorney-client
183
Once the judge determines that the
privilege in this circumstance.
181

See generally United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554 (1989) (discussing the crimefraud exception to attorney-client privilege).
182
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2003) (“A lawyer shall not bring
or defend a proceeding . . . unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so . . . .”).
183
See id. R. 1.6(a) (“A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a client unless the client gives informed consent . . . .”). But cf. id. R. 3.3(b)
(“A lawyer who represents a client in an adjudicative proceeding and who knows that a
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conversation is protected by the privilege, the in camera review ends,
and the judge can make no further use of the materials. Furthermore,
the fact that one-quarter of the twelve judges who ordered the production of the audiotape also ruled in favor of the plaintiff suggests that
the tape is not dispositive and the suit is not wholly frivolous.
Even though the results of this scenario suggest that the judges’
ability to ignore materials they deem privileged will be limited, this
scenario has limitations of its own. For instance, judges in actual cases
might be better able to disregard this information because they would
have learned many more details about the case. Judges in our study
who were exposed to the inadmissible evidence about the plaintiff
might have inferred that the rest of the plaintiff’s case was also quite
weak. On the other hand, the privileged information in our materials
constitutes the single best piece of evidence available in the case—that
is, an admission by plaintiff that he has no case. Extra detail in a real
case would be unlikely to undermine the importance of this admission.
Judges might also perform better in actual cases than they did in
our study because their motivation to limit their decision to the record
would be greater in a real case than in a hypothetical one. Increased
motivation might cut both ways, however. On the one hand, a judge
has more incentive in the real world to follow the evidence rules and
ignore inadmissible information; on the other hand, a judge also has
more incentive in the real world to thwart the kind of frivolous claim
the plaintiff is advancing and to reach a just outcome on the merits.
C. Rape-Shield Case
Our third scenario explores whether judges can disregard the
sexual history of the alleged victim of a sexual assault. The admissibility of a victim’s sexual history in sexual assault cases has been the sub184
The prospect of
ject of debate and legal reform for some time.
cross-examination by a hostile attorney delving into one’s sexual past
can deter the victim of a sexual assault from pursuing a case against a

person intends to engage, is engaging or has engaged in criminal or fraudulent conduct related to the proceeding shall take reasonable remedial measures, including, if
necessary, disclosure to the tribunal.”).
184
See Michelle J. Anderson, From Chastity Requirement to Sexuality License: Sexual
Consent and a New Rape Shield Law, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 51, 81-86 (2002) (discussing
different categories of rape-shield laws).
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185

perpetrator.
Furthermore, a victim’s sexual history frequently is of
questionable relevance. Arguably, any effect such testimony has arises
merely from stereotypes.
On the other hand, one cannot entirely rule out the relevance of
sexual history in a case involving a dispute over consent. To some, a
history of sexual promiscuity suggests that a sexual encounter is more
likely to be consensual. One could argue exactly the opposite, however. After lodging a complaint in a sexual assault case, a sexually experienced woman might be more credible, having had a history of
sexual encounters in which she did not make such allegations. The
186
former view appears to be more common.
In the face of these concerns, many jurisdictions have adopted socalled “rape-shield” statutes to limit the admissibility of sexual history
187
evidence.
The relevant rape-shield provision in this instance—
188
Arizona’s —differs somewhat from the norm. Arizona’s statute specifically prohibits the introduction of evidence of an alleged victim’s
chastity, rather than evidence of her sexual history. Arizona’s statute
takes this curious approach because the state has long barred evidence
189
Arizona
of a victim’s sexual history through the common law.
adopted its statute in light of this history, and it is intended to extend
the rape-shield prohibition from sexual history evidence often proffered by a defendant to demonstrate consent to chastity evidence
sometimes proffered by a prosecutor to demonstrate lack of consent.
190
Courts now construe the statute to prohibit both kinds of evidence.

185

See FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee’s note (“The rule aims to safeguard
the alleged victim against the invasion of privacy, potential embarrassment and sexual
stereotyping that is associated with public disclosure of intimate sexual details . . . .”).
186
See Anderson, supra note 184, at 104 (“A pattern of consensual sexual behavior
might reveal that the woman has had a considerable amount of sex but has never
falsely accused someone of rape.”). See generally Morrison Torrey, When Will We Be Believed? Rape Myths and the Idea of a Fair Trial in Rape Prosecutions, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1013 (1991).
187
See Anderson, supra note 184, at 81-85 (reviewing in brief the history of rapeshield laws).
188
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1421 (West 2003).
189
See, e.g., State ex rel. Pope v. Superior Court, 545 P.2d 946, 950 (Ariz. 1976) (en
banc) (“The law does not and should not recognize any necessary connection between
a witness’ veracity and her sexual immorality.” (citing, inter alia, Sage v. State, 195 P.
533 (Ariz. 1921))).
190
See State v. Gilfillan, 998 P.2d 1069, 1074 n.3 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000) (observing
that Arizona’s rape-shield statute codified the common law prohibition against the introduction of sexual history evidence, except in rare circumstances).
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Prior studies of mock jurors suggest that they have difficulty disregarding inadmissible information about the sexual history of an al191
leged sexual assault victim. Generally, mock jurors are less likely to
convict the defendant and are more likely to attribute greater respon192
Despite significant differences
sibility for the events to the victim.
between a typical mock juror and a typical judge, judges, like mock jurors, might be hard pressed to ignore this evidence, even if they deem
it inadmissible at trial.
1. Rape-Shield Case: The Scenario
To assess whether judges might be influenced by inadmissible
sexual history evidence, we created and administered a scenario enti193
tled “Evaluation of a Criminal Case.” In this scenario, the participat194
ing judges learn that they are presiding in a bench trial involving a
sexual assault allegedly committed by Mr. Geiger against Ms. Smith.
Both the complainant and defendant are students at a local university who were attending a fraternity party on the night in question.
The complainant, who had recently become engaged, began drinking
heavily at the party and was seen talking with the defendant, whom
she had not previously met. At some point, the defendant “seemed to
help [her] ‘walk’ or ‘stagger’ into [his] room” at the fraternity
195
house.
The complainant’s fiancé began looking for her, eventually
found her in the defendant’s room, and “discovered [the defendant]
196
on top of [her]; her skirt was pulled up over her waist.” The fiancé
“pulled Mr. Geiger off of Ms. Smith, threw him onto the floor, and
197
then stormed off. Ms. Smith got up and ran after him.”
191

See Lenehan & O’Neill, supra note 94, at 238 (“[E]arlier evidence against the
victim . . . produced significantly higher probability of [a guilty verdict] than where all
factors were against the defendant . . . .”); Regina A. Schuller & Patricia A. Hastings, Complainant Sexual History Evidence: Its Impact on Mock Jurors’ Decisions, 26 PSYCHOL. WOMEN
Q. 252, 259 (2002) (“[T]he proposed safeguard of providing jurors with limiting instructions may be ineffective in curbing the pernicious impact of prior [sexual] history
evidence.”).
192
See, e.g., Schuller & Hastings, supra note 191, at 259 (“[P]articipants who heard
that a rape complainant had had a prior sexual relationship with the man accused of
her rape, were more negative in their evaluations of the woman . . . .”).
193
Infra Appendix, pp. 1336-37.
194
We gave Version 1 of this scenario to all of the judges in the urban jurisdiction
and Version 2 to all of the judges in Maricopa County. Supra Table 1, p. 1285.
195
Infra Appendix, p. 1336.
196
Infra Appendix, p. 1336.
197
Infra Appendix, p. 1336.
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Ms. Smith reported the alleged assault to the police two hours
later. She asserted that she had refused to have sex with the defendant and had shouted “no” a couple of times, but that he had forced
himself on her. The police officer who interviewed her reported that
she was visibly upset while telling the story; moreover, “[a] physical
198
examination revealed bruises on her upper thighs.” Her fiancé initially thought the encounter was consensual, but he subsequently
changed his mind. Before the incident, the complainant had been
cheerful and extroverted, but since the incident occurred, she had become moody and depressed. The defendant testified on his own behalf, asserting that the encounter had been consensual. He contended that although he had previously had casual sex with other
women at parties, he had never engaged in nonconsensual sex with
anyone.
In addition to learning this information, the judges assigned to
the suppression condition learn that the defendant wants to present
evidence of the victim’s sexual history:
In his defense, Mr. Geiger is trying to introduce testimony from five
other students, 3 male and 2 female, that Ms. Smith had a well-deserved
reputation for being sexually promiscuous. This includes one of Ms.
Smith’s best friends who will testify that before Ms. Smith met her fiancé,
she “had trouble remembering what fraternity house she woke up in
each Sunday morning.” Another witness, a former roommate of Ms.
Smith will assert that Ms. Smith “liked to loosen her inhibitions with a
few beers too many and then have rough sex with the first guy she
199
saw.”

The judges also learn that “the prosecution has moved to exclude
such evidence on the ground that it violates Arizona’s ‘Rape Shield’
statute . . . which forbids the introduction of evidence concerning a
victim’s ‘chastity’ or ‘reputation for chastity’ in cases involving sexual
200
The materials then ask the judges in the suppression conassault.”
dition how they would rule on this motion to suppress the evidence.
Finally, the judges assigned to both the control group and the suppression group are asked to indicate whether they would find the de201
fendant guilty of sexual assault.
198

Infra Appendix, p. 1336.
Infra Appendix, p. 1337.
200
Infra Appendix, p. 1337.
201
We tested this phenomenon in the urban jurisdiction using similar materials.
The results from this jurisdiction, however, were inconclusive. In the prior version, the
materials identify a longer delay in the victim’s reporting of the assault and do not in199
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2. Rape-Shield Case: The Results
The judges struggled with this case. In the control condition,
49.1% (27 out of 55) of the judges found the defendant guilty. The
judges in the suppression condition were much more likely to find the
defendant not guilty. Among the judges in the suppression group
who ruled that the sexual history evidence should be excluded, a mere
20% (7 out of 35) convicted the defendant. The difference between
202
these two groups was statistically significant.
Some of the judges (27.1%, or 13 out of 48) decided to admit the
evidence. Among these judges, 7.7% (1 out of 13) convicted the defendant. The percentage of guilty verdicts in this group did not differ
significantly from that among the judges who suppressed the evidence
203
(20.0%).
Further analysis, using logistic regression on the verdict with gender, experience, and the interaction of these two variables with condition as independent variables, revealed no significant main effects of
experience or the interaction of experience with condition. The gen204
der of the judges produced an effect that was marginally significant.
Specifically, across the two conditions, female judges were more likely
to convict (48.2%, or 13 out of 27) than male judges (31.7%, or 19 out
of 60). This effect did not interact significantly with condition. The
conviction rates among both male and female judges who had suppressed the past sexual history were identical (20.0%), although the
conviction rate among female judges in the control condition was
higher than among male judges (64.7%, 11 out of 17, versus 40%, 14
out of 35).
clude references to bruising. The victim is also not described as engaging in drinking
and voluntarily went with the defendant to his room. These materials produced a low
conviction rate in the control condition. Thus, the sexual history had no further
power to reduce the conviction rate. In the earlier version, however, we also asked
judges to report their confidence in the appropriateness of the verdict on a seven-point
scale. Although we observed no differences in the conviction rates, we did obtain a
significant difference in the confidence ratings. That is, judges expressed more confidence in their acquittals after viewing the sexual history evidence than judges in the
control condition. To determine whether the conviction rate would be affected by the
inadmissible testimony, we altered the evidence to increase the conviction rate in the
control condition and presented the materials to another group of judges.
202
Fisher’s exact p = .01.
203
Fisher’s exact p = .42.
204
The Z-score of the coefficient for gender was 1.64, p = 10. Throughout this paper, we refer to any statistical test that produced a significance level between .05 and
.10 as “marginally significant.”
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3. Rape-Shield Case: Discussion
Exposure to the victim’s sexual history appears to have influenced
the judges’ decisions. The conviction rate dropped by nearly 30%
among judges who had excluded the evidence compared to judges
who were not exposed to the evidence. Even though the judges ruled
the evidence inadmissible, it still influenced their assessments of the
defendant’s guilt.
Although most of the judges decided that the evidence of the victim’s sexual history was inadmissible, some decided to admit it. One
judge later remarked that he admitted the testimony precisely because
it seemed so relevant, so perhaps the judges who admitted the testimony differed from the judges who excluded it in that they believed
the testimony was more probative than their colleagues who sustained
the objection. Regardless, there is no statistically significant difference between the verdicts rendered by the judges who admitted the
evidence and the judges who excluded it (although the numbers are
small). Once exposed to the evidence, they were affected by it—
regardless of their view of admissibility.
These materials present one important difference from most cases
of sexual assault that might limit the generality of the findings. The
sexual history evidence matched the circumstances of the sexual encounter closely. The victim’s history is not merely one of sexual experience, but one of intoxication, and casual, “rough” sex of precisely
the type that would explain how this encounter might have been consensual. It is possible that the judges might have reacted differently to
our scenario if the victim’s sexual history had been more mundane
and less similar to the alleged crime at issue in the case.
Nonetheless, the results suggest that ignoring a victim’s sexual history can be challenging, especially if the decision maker believes it to
be relevant to the issue of consent. The rape-shield statutes thus
might serve the purpose of keeping a victim’s private life private, but
the evidence they ostensibly protect might still influence those fact
205
finders who learn of it before or during trial.

205

See Anderson, supra note 184, at 94-137 (providing an extensive review of exceptions to rape-shield laws that allow admissibility of a rape victim’s sexual history).
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D. Prior Criminal Conviction
Our fourth scenario explores whether judges can disregard a prior
criminal conviction that is presumptively inadmissible under the rules
of evidence. Rule 609 of both the Federal Rules and the Arizona
Rules of Evidence imposes various limits on the admissibility of prior
206
criminal convictions. Where more than ten years have elapsed since
the completion of a sentence resulting from a conviction, the evidence of the conviction is inadmissible unless “the probative value of
the conviction [is] supported by specific facts and circumstances
207
This “time
[and] substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect.”
limit” rule is an intrinsic exclusionary rule that limits the admissibility
of the prior criminal conviction on the grounds that it might preju208
dice the fact finder.
As with many of the rules that limit admissibility on the grounds
that evidence is prejudicial, the rules governing prior criminal convictions rest on an empirical assumption about the effect of admitting
such evidence. Rule 609 assumes that a witness’s criminal past will
lead juries to make inappropriate decisions motivated by animus to209
ward an individual who has committed mistakes in the distant past.
206

FED. R. EVID. 609; ARIZ. R. EVID. 609.
Rule 609(b) of both the Federal and Arizona Rules provides as follows:
Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible if a period of more
than ten years has elapsed since the date of the conviction or of the release of
the witness from the confinement imposed for that conviction, whichever is
the later date, unless the court determines, in the interests of justice, that the
probative value of the conviction supported by specific facts and circumstances substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect. However, evidence of a
conviction more than [ten] years old as calculated herein, is not admissible
unless the proponent gives to the adverse party sufficient advance written notice of intent to use such evidence to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to contest the use of such evidence.
FED. R. EVID. 609(b); ARIZ. R. EVID. 609(b).
208
See supra text accompanying note 7. Other portions of Rule 609—for example,
Rule 609(d), which limits the admissibility of juvenile convictions—are perhaps more
appropriately classified as extrinsic exclusionary rules. See supra text accompanying
note 9.
209
Indeed, this assumption finds empirical support from mock jury studies. See,
e.g., Doob & Kirshenbaum, supra note 94, at 94-96 (finding that evidence of prior convictions significantly increased the likelihood that jurors would find a defendant guilty,
despite a judge’s limiting instructions); Greene & Dodge, supra note 94, at 76 (finding
that jurors who learn of a defendant’s prior conviction are more likely to convict him
of a subsequent offense); Hans & Doob, supra note 101, at 251 (finding that the presentation of a defendant’s criminal record to a jury significantly increases the likelihood
of a guilty verdict); London & Nunez, supra note 95, at 937 (finding that predelibera207
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Perhaps judges, who have experience weighing evidence, might be
better able than jurors to disregard such potentially prejudicial information.
1. Prior Criminal Conviction: The Scenario
To assess whether judges might be influenced by evidence of a
prior criminal conviction, we created and administered a scenario en210
titled “Assessment of Pain and Suffering Damages.” In this scenario,
211
the participating judges are told that they are presiding in a bench
trial in which the only issue is the appropriate damage award for pain
and suffering.
The judges learn that the case involves a products liability suit
filed by an individual plaintiff against a lawnmower manufacturer (for
the judges in Arizona) or a snowblower manufacturer (for the judges
in Minnesota). The plaintiff is a single, 35-year-old automobile mechanic who was badly injured while operating the piece of machinery.
Although it was equipped with a kill-switch that should have prevented
the injury, a manufacturing defect caused the switch to fail, resulting
in a serious injury to the plaintiff’s nondominant arm. The defendant
concedes liability and pecuniary damages but disputes the appropriate
amount of pain and suffering damages.
With respect to those damages, the plaintiff presents testimony
from doctors concerning the extent of his injury and pain. The doctors indicate that his injured arm does not need to be amputated, but
is likely to remain useless. The plaintiff also testifies on his own behalf, describing “continuing pain in his arm, the loss of his job, the
frustration of adapting to life with just one usable arm, and the nature
212
The plaintiff
and extent of his pain and resulting total disability.”

tion jurors tend to be biased by the presentation of inadmissible evidence); Reinard &
Reynolds, supra note 93, at 105 (finding that “jurors do not . . . consistently disregard
sensational inadmissible testimony,” even when instructed by a judge to do so); Tanford & Cox, supra note 94, at 177 (finding that “impeachment evidence leads to
harsher judgements of a civil defendant” for both credibility and liability); Tanford &
Cox, supra note 93, at 494 (finding that juries told of a witness’s prior conviction perceived the witness as less credible and inferred greater propensity for future harm and
negligence).
210
Infra Appendix, pp. 1338-39.
211
We gave this scenario to all of the federal magistrate judges attending the conference in Minneapolis and all of the Arizona trial court judges attending the conference in Maricopa County. Supra Table 1, p. 1285.
212
Infra Appendix, p. 1338.
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further testifies that “he had to take prescription narcotic pain medi213
For its part, the defendant offers testimony
cation continuously.”
suggesting that the plaintiff is exaggerating his injury. The defendant
also presents testimony from an occupational therapist, who states that
people with such injuries “usually can control their pain and lead rela214
tively normal lives.”
215
The judges assigned to the suppression group received an extra
paragraph after the defendant’s testimony. The judges in this group
learn that the defendant seeks to introduce evidence that the plaintiff
has a criminal record. Specifically, he “had been convicted of swindling schemes in which he obtained the life savings of elderly retirees
by falsely promising them exorbitant rates of return, and then using
216
their money to pay his living expenses.” The materials note that the
plaintiff’s most recent conviction had been fourteen years ago and
that he had spent two years in prison. The plaintiff objects to the introduction of this testimony, even for the limited purpose of impeaching his credibility, on the ground that the probative value of this old
conviction does not substantially outweigh its prejudicial effect under
the applicable evidentiary rule. The judges are then asked to rule on
the objection. Finally, judges in both the control group and the suppression group are asked to indicate how much they would award the
plaintiff in compensatory damages.
2. Prior Criminal Conviction: The Results
Table 4 presents the results of the study of prior criminal convictions. The judges who ruled that the prior criminal convictions were
not admissible awarded an average of 12% less in pain and suffering
damages than did those judges who were not exposed to the plaintiff’s
criminal history. The difference between these two groups was mar217
ginally statistically significant, using a nonparametric test. Although
213

Infra Appendix, p. 1338.
Infra Appendix, p. 1339.
215
Among the Arizona judges, two-thirds of the judges received the suppression
condition and one-third received the control condition. This was done because many
of the judges in Minnesota admitted the testimony. To try to create a more balanced
design, we thus decided to oversample the suppression condition. The results demonstrate no differences in the awards from different judges, see infra Part II.D.2, and thus
this oversampling is unlikely to have skewed the results.
216
Infra Appendix, p. 1338.
217
Mann-Whitney U = 2528.5, p = .075. The suppression condition includes one
$10 million award, which dwarfs the other awards and raises the mean award in the
214
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the judges who sustained the objection and the judges who overruled
the objection appear to have produced somewhat different awards,
218
these differences were not significant.
Table 4: Past Criminal Conviction: Means and Quartile Results
(in $1000s)
Condition (and n)

Mean

1st Quartile

Median

3d Quartile

Control (43)

1000

Suppression (73)

778

300

500

Sustain (61)

685

200

400

800

Overrule (12)

406

163

275

713

We also attempted to assess the effects of gender, court, and experience.
We performed these analyses on a logarithmic
transformation of the raw awards so as to create a normal distribution
of the awards. We regressed the log of the award on condition (using
only those judges who sustained the objection in the suppression
condition), gender, court, and an interaction term of condition with
gender, court, and experience. We found no significant main effects
or interactions for any of these terms.
3. Prior Criminal Conviction: Discussion
Exposure to the plaintiff’s prior criminal conviction appears to
have influenced the judges’ decisions, even though most judges ruled
to suppress the information. The mean awards were somewhat lower
among judges who had seen the evidence and sustained the objection,
and the distribution of awards was generally shifted downwards. Much
like mock jurors, judges seemed unable to ignore a prior conviction.
Although the results revealed no statistically significant differences
between the judges who ruled the conviction inadmissible and the
judges who admitted the evidence, few conclusions can be drawn from
this result. The number of judges who admitted the conviction is too
small to make a meaningful comparison. Judges who admitted the
conviction seemed to produce lower awards than judges who sup-

suppression-sustain condition by nearly $200,000. This award, along with the general
skewness of the distributions, makes the parametric test particularly inappropriate. A
t -test on the log-transformed data, however, also produced a marginally significant difference. t(101) = 1.82, p = .07.
218
Mann-Whitney U = 2298.5, p > .50. A t -test on the log-transformed data also was
not significant. Two-sample t(68) = 0.67, p > .5.
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pressed the conviction, but the trend did not approach significance,
possibly due to the small number of judges who admitted the evidence. It could be that the judges who suppressed the conviction
were able to discount the conviction to some extent. The groups are
not, however, completely comparable. Judges who admitted the testimony presumably did so because they believed that the testimony’s
probative value substantially outweighed the prejudicial effect.
Hence, the judges who admitted the testimony probably gave it more
weight than judges who suppressed it.
These results support the general proposition that judges also
have difficulty ignoring intrinsically excluded testimony. The results
leave the exact mechanisms for how the materials influenced the
judges unidentified, however. Because the past crime was one involving fraud, it could be that the judges discredited the plaintiff’s account of his injuries. On the other hand, it might be that the judges
who learned of it simply awarded less money to the plaintiff because
they deemed him a socially undesirable character. Either way, judges
were affected by the evidence that they themselves had ruled inadmissible. Future versions of this study (in which the past crime is odious,
such as child molestation, but not associated directly with fraud) could
help disentangle these potential underlying mechanisms.
E. Postconviction Cooperation Agreement
Our fifth scenario explores whether judges can disregard information a prosecutor obtained from a cooperating criminal defendant
and then inappropriately used against him in a sentencing hearing.
When the government enters into a plea agreement containing a co219
operation clause, it is bound to honor the agreement. The government is not permitted to renege on the agreement and use informa220
In the
tion it uncovers from the defendant against that defendant.
219

See, e.g., United States v. Khan, 920 F.2d 1100, 1105 (2d Cir. 1990) (“[C]ooperation
agreements, like plea bargains, may usefully be interpreted with principles borrowed
from the law of contract. . . . [T]he government’s discretion does not grant it power to
turn its back on its promises to the defendant under the cooperation agreement . . . .”); United States v. Rexach, 896 F.2d 710, 713-14 (2d Cir. 1990) (“Cooperation agreements, like plea bargains, are interpreted according to principles of contract
law. . . . [T]he scope of the government’s discretion [does not] permit it to ignore or
renege on contractual commitments to defendants.”).
220
The federal sentencing guidelines themselves forbid the use of incriminating
information provided by the defendant as part of a cooperation agreement with the
prosecution. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.8 (2004).
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event that a judge is exposed to such information, the judge should
disregard it in sentencing the defendant. Despite this, we expect the
judges to be influenced by exposure to such information.
1. Postconviction Cooperation Agreement: The Scenario
To assess whether judges might be influenced by such informa221
In this scenario,
tion, we created a scenario entitled “Sentencing.”
the participating judges learn that they are presiding in a criminal
sentencing hearing. Appearing in front of the judges is Sam Kaiser,
who was found guilty of possession of 150 grams of methamphetamine, which carries a base offense level of “26” under the federal sen222
tencing guidelines.
Kaiser, who is twenty-seven years old, dropped out of high school
when he was seventeen, has never held a job for long, is unmarried,
and has no children. The judges learn that Kaiser had several prior
convictions for larceny and minor drug possession, so he has four
223
“criminal history points” under the guidelines sum, which puts him
in “Category III” for sentencing under the federal sentencing guide224
The materials inform the judges that the appropriate senlines.
tence for him is from 78 to 97 months, given his criminal history
225
points and the offense level.
Following his conviction, Kaiser cooperated with the prosecution
in exchange for a sentencing recommendation. Additionally, as part
of this agreement, the prosecution agreed that it would not use any of
the information it learned from him against him.
Judges in the control group also learn that “Kaiser revealed the
226
name of his supplier, but nothing else of substance.” Judges in the
suppression group learn that Kaiser “had helped his 30-year-old cousin
produce methamphetamine in a basement laboratory,” and that “his
cousin had a 15-year-old girlfriend who frequently ‘tried out’ their
227
The judges in this group then learn that the
batches for them.”
221

Infra Appendix, pp. 1340-41.
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1(c)(7) (providing for a base offense level of 26 for possession of “[a]t least 50 G but less than 200 G of Methamphetamine”).
223
Id. § 4A1.1(c).
224
Id. § 5A.
225
Id.
226
Infra Appendix, p. 1340.
227
Infra Appendix, p. 1340.
222
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prosecution has asked them to add six levels to Kaiser’s offense level
because “he had been engaged in the manufacture of methampheta228
mine in a fashion that had endangered a minor.” Under the guidelines, if such information was properly presented, it would warrant
229
judges raising the offense level by that amount. If that were to happen here, Kaiser would face a sentence from 151 to 188 months under
230
the guidelines.
Kaiser’s attorney argues that the prosecution reneged on its deal and cannot use this information against him in sentencing.
Thereafter, the materials inform both groups of judges that “[n]o
other circumstances supporting any additional enhancements, depar231
tures, or other adjustments are present.” The materials then ask the
judges to sentence Kaiser.
2. Postconviction Cooperation Agreement: The Results
This information had an untoward effect on the sentences handed
down by the judges. All but one of the thirteen judges in the control
condition sentenced Kaiser to 78 months, the shortest possible sentence under the guidelines. The only judge who deviated from this
sentence departed downwardly, sentencing Kaiser to just 60 months
(and was dropped from the analysis, having disregarded the instruc232
In the suppression condition, 86.7% (13 out of 15) of the
tions).
judges rejected the prosecution’s request to raise the offense level.
Nonetheless, exposure to the negative information about the defendant influenced their behavior. In contrast to judges in the control
condition, only 46.2% (6 out of 13) of these judges chose 78 months
233
On average, the thirteen judges who rejected the
as the sentence.
prosecutor’s request sentenced Kaiser to 85.9 months in prison. The
difference between the control group judges and the suppression

228

Infra Appendix, p. 1340.
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1(b)(6)(C).
230
Id. § 5A.
231
Infra Appendix, p. 1341.
232
Including this judge in the analysis would only have strengthened the observed
effect of the improperly presented evidence.
233
Taking as the dependent measure the binary decision of whether to give the
defendant the minimum sentence, the difference between the two conditions was significant. Fisher’s exact p = .006.
229
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group judges who denied the prosecution’s motion was statistically
234
significant.
3. Postconviction Cooperation Agreement: Discussion
Although nearly 90% of the judges determined that the information the defendant provided while cooperating with the government
could not be used against him at sentencing, the availability of this information increased the defendant’s sentence. The information that
the defendant provided about the nature of his offense seemed to alter the judges’ impressions of him. In the control condition, the
judges may have viewed the defendant as just another hapless drug
dealer for whom the guideline range was too severe. All of the judges
in the control condition imposed the minimum sentence. When the
defendant’s testimony revealed that he had endangered and abused a
minor, however, judges meted out stiffer sentences. Neither the government’s agreement not to use the information nor the court’s obligation to enforce it protected this defendant from its effects on his
sentence.
The behavior of the judges in the control condition is also noteworthy. Except for one judge who inexplicably deviated below the
sentencing minimum, all provided exactly the same sentence—the
minimum under the guidelines. Although complaints that the federal
235
sentencing guidelines are too harsh in drug cases are common,
there is little direct empirical evidence that judges view them this
236
Our study inadvertently provided some indirect evidence on
way.

234

An ordinary two-sample t -test cannot be run on these data due to the lack of
variation among the control group. However, the null hypothesis that the suppression
group’s true mean is also 78 months can be rejected. t(12) = 3.34, p = .006.
235
See, e.g., Ian Weinstein, Fifteen Years After the Federal Sentencing Revolution: How
Mandatory Minimums Have Undermined Effective and Just Narcotics Sentencing, 40 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 87, 126 (2003) (“The currently pervasive mandatory minimum statutes make
narcotics sentences indefensibly rigid, often unfair and unjustly harsh.”); Justice Kennedy
Speaks Out, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2003, at A16 (noting Justice Kennedy’s argument that
sentencing guidelines need to be “revised downward”); John S. Martin Jr., Let Judges Do
Their Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2003, at A31 (announcing retirement due to the “distress I feel at being part of a sentencing system that is unnecessarily cruel and rigid”) .
236
In fact, the academic literature shows that judges disagree over the federal sentencing guidelines and their effects. Compare Judge Louis F. Oberdorfer, Mandatory
Sentencing: One Judge’s Perspective—2002, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 11, 16 (2003) (arguing
that discrepancies in the treatment of drug offenders under the guidelines are “the
most serious vice” in the guidelines), with Gerard E. Lynch, Sentencing Eddie, 91 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 547, 560 (2001) (“The guidelines . . . make a fairly sophisticated
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this point. In every other scenario we have presented, in both this paper and in our prior research, we have found variations among
judges—especially when the outcome consists of a continuous parameter (such as months or dollars), as opposed to a binary parameter
(such as verdict or ruling). That judges of different political parties,
different genders, different amounts of experience, and doubtless
with different attitudes toward the war on drugs all agree to sentence
at the exact bottom of the guidelines range suggests that the judges
perceive 78 months to be too harsh a sentence for possessing 150
grams of methamphetamine.
Finally, this study also has implications for the Supreme Court’s
recent pronouncements on sentencing guidelines in Blakely v. Wash237
238
In these cases, the Court struck
ington and United States v. Booker.
down both a state sentencing scheme and the federal sentencing
guidelines as inconsistent with the right to a jury trial. The Court
concluded that any fact that increases a defendant’s maximum sen239
The problem with the holding,
tence must be submitted to a jury.
from our perspective, is that statutory sentencing ranges can be quite
broad. Our results suggest that even if a judge does not have an explicit jury finding on a particular fact that would raise the upper limit
of the defendant’s sentencing, evidence tending to prove this fact
might still influence the judge in determining what sentence to impose within that original range. This is what occurred in our study. As
we have shown, sentencing guidelines do not eliminate the possibility
of such extraneous influences. Sentencing guidelines, however, mitigate the problem by confining the influence of this extraneous information.

effort to assess the weight of an offender’s prior record.”), and Angela LaBuda Collins,
Note, The Latest Amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c): Congressional Reaction to the Supreme
Court’s Interpretation of the Statute, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 1319, 1343 n.156 (1999) (noting
that Justice Breyer was a strong supporter of the guidelines during his tenure as Chief
Judge of the First Circuit).
237
124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).
238
125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).
239
Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2543 (“The Framers would not have thought it too much to
demand that, before depriving a man of three more years of his liberty, the State
should suffer the modest inconvenience of submitting its accusation to ‘the unanimous
suffrage of twelve of his equals and neighbours’ rather than a lone employee of the
State.” (citation omitted)), quoted with alterations in Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 752.
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F. Hindsight and Probable Cause
Our sixth scenario explores whether judges can disregard the outcome of a search when deciding whether the police had probable
cause to conduct the search in the first place. The Fourth Amend240
ment requires that police searches be based on “probable cause.”
Evidence obtained from a search conducted without probable cause is
inadmissible on the ground that it violates the Fourth Amendment’s
“right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
241
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”
Despite this prohibition, judges required to rule on the legality of
a search might have difficulty disregarding the outcome of the search
242
due to the hindsight bias. In most aspects of life, the hindsight bias
creates few problems because few occasions call for a reassessment of
what could have been known in the past. In the courtroom, however,
243
Many situations, from derepredicting the past is commonplace.
termining what accidents tort defendants should have been able to
avoid to assessing whether an invention was “obvious” in patent law,
require judges and jurors to ignore the known outcome and assess
what was predictable ex ante.
Likewise, when a judge must rule on the admissibility of the fruits
of a search conducted without a warrant, she does so with the knowledge that the search produced incriminating evidence. If the hindsight bias affects judges’ assessments of probable cause, then judges in
hindsight will admit evidence obtained under circumstances in which
police could not have obtained a warrant in foresight. Some com244
245
mentators and even the Supreme Court itself have suggested that

240

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Id.
242
See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
243
See Rachlinski, supra note 77, at 571 (explaining that despite the obstacle of accurately assessing the predictability of outcomes, the law constantly requires courts to
make these determinations).
244
See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77 VA. L.
REV. 881, 915 (1991) (arguing that granting warrants before a magistrate knows
whether the police will find evidence or whether the suspect is a criminal helps eliminate judicial bias).
245
See Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964) (“An arrest without a warrant bypasses
the safeguards provided by an objective predetermination of probable cause, and substitutes instead the far less reliable procedure of an after-the-event justification for the
arrest or search, too likely to be subtly influenced by the familiar shortcomings of
hindsight judgment.”).
241
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one of the principal purposes of requiring a warrant is to avoid making assessments of probable cause entirely in hindsight.
Previous studies suggest that the hindsight bias influences judges.
In our earlier work, we found that judges overestimated the predict246
ability of outcomes on appeal.
Other researchers have found that
247
the hindsight bias influences judicial assessments of negligence.
In
these studies, researchers found that judges were more likely to identify conduct as unreasonable, negligent, or even reckless after learning
that the conduct had produced an accident. None of these studies directly addresses the issue of the hindsight bias in probable cause determinations, although there is some evidence that mock jurors are in248
fluenced by it.
1. Hindsight and Probable Cause: The Scenario
To determine whether judges might be influenced by the outcome of a potentially defective search, we created and administered a
249
In this scenario, we
scenario labeled “Fourth Amendment Issue.”
250
asked participating judges assigned to the control group to determine whether they would grant a warrant under the circumstances described, and we asked participating judges assigned to the suppression

246

Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, supra note 108, at 801-03 (providing evidence
that learning an alleged outcome on appeal significantly affected judges’ assessments
of the most likely outcome).
247
See John C. Anderson, D. Jordan Lowe & Philip M.J. Reckers, Evaluation of Auditor Decisions: Hindsight Bias Effects and the Expectation Gap, 14 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 711, 732
(1993) (finding judges’ evaluations of auditor performance to be significantly biased
by outcome information); Reid Hastie & W. Kip Viscusi, What Juries Can’t Do Well: The
Jury’s Performance as a Risk Manager, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 901, 906 (1998) (finding a statistically insignificant trend towards hindsight effects among judges evaluating a negligence case); W. Kip Viscusi, How Do Judges Think About Risk?, 1 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 26,
50-51 (1999) (presenting evidence of the role of hindsight bias on judicial decision
making).
248
See Jonathan D. Casper & Kennette M. Benedict, The Influence of Outcome Information and Attitudes on Juror Decision Making in Search and Seizure Cases, in INSIDE THE
JUROR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUROR DECISION MAKING 65, 81-82 (Reid Hastie ed., 1993)
(finding mock jurors’ decisions affected by outcome information); Jonathan D. Casper, Kennette Benedict & Jo L. Perry, Juror Decision Making, Attitudes, and the Hindsight
Bias, 13 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 291, 300 (1989) (finding, in a laboratory experiment, results consistent with hindsight bias).
249
Infra Appendix, pp. 1342-43.
250
We gave Version 1 of this scenario to all of the judges in the urban jurisdiction
and Version 2 to all of the judges in Minneapolis. Supra Table 1, p. 1285.
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condition to rule on the admissibility of evidence collected without a
251
warrant under the same circumstances.
In both cases, the judges learn that a police officer was on patrol
in a parking lot outside a large arena hosting a rock concert. The officer noticed a well-dressed, nervous-looking man exit a BMW and fiddle with something in the trunk of his car. The man then met a
friend, bought tickets to the event, and entered the arena. Thirty
minutes later, the officer noticed that one of the BMW’s windows was
rolled down. Concerned that the car might be burglarized, he approached the car to close the window. Upon arriving at the car, the
officer stated that he “smelled something that he believed, based on a
demonstration at a training session several years earlier, to be burnt
methamphetamine. He looked inside the car and didn’t see any
drugs, but he did notice some Visine, a local map, and a couple of
252
empty beer cans.”
In the foresight condition, the materials then stated that the police officer requested a telephonic warrant to search the trunk of the
253
car. The materials asked simply, “Will you issue the warrant?” In the
hindsight condition, the materials stated that “[b]ased on these observations,” the police officer searched the trunk of the car. The search
produced “10 pounds of methamphetamine, other drug parapherna254
lia, and a gun that had recently been fired.” The gun turned out to
match a weapon used to murder a drug dealer across town earlier that
evening. The driver was then arrested and tried. The materials noted
that the defense attorney has moved to suppress the evidence obtained in the search, arguing that the police officer lacked probable
cause for the search. The materials then asked, “Will you allow the
255
evidence to be admitted?”

251

Infra Appendix, p. 1342.
Infra Appendix, p. 1342.
253
Infra Appendix, p. 1342.
254
Infra Appendix, p. 1342.
255
Infra Appendix, p. 1343. There was an error in the phrasing of the two available answers in the version of this question given to the unnamed jurisdiction that
makes the answers confusing. Specifically, the judges were given the question “Will
you rule to suppress the evidence?” and two options: “Yes, there was probable cause to
justify the search” and “No, there was not probable cause to justify the search.” Nevertheless, most of the judges reported understanding what the question was asking, and
so we include these results here. Also, as discussed, their results did not differ from
those of the federal magistrate judges later tested in Minneapolis, for whom we corrected the error.
252
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The materials thus take advantage of an exception to the warrant
requirement. Police officers who face “exigent circumstances” may
undertake the search even without a warrant, so long as they have
256
probable cause. Automobile searches are considered per se exigent
257
Nevertheless, police sometimes do request warrants
circumstances.
for automobile searches to ensure the admissibility of evidence uncovered during the search. Hence, both the hindsight and the foresight
conditions represent plausible variations on the underlying story.
2. Hindsight and Probable Cause: The Results
In foresight, 23.9% (11 out of 46) of the judges concluded that
there was probable cause for a search and granted a warrant; in hindsight, 27.7% (13 out of 47) of the judges concluded that there was
probable cause for a search and ruled the testimony admissible.
There obviously was not a statistically significant difference between
258
these two groups. Logistic regression of the decision on court, gender, experience, and the interaction of these variables with condition
revealed no significant effects.
It is possible that the lack of a statistically significant effect might
have resulted from a limited sample size. We note, however, that the
sample size was sufficient in that it had an 87.4% chance of detecting a
significant or marginally significant difference if the true difference
259
between foresight and hindsight was 30 percentage points. In other
words, if the true difference between the foresight and hindsight conditions was actually similar in magnitude to the differences found in
the attorney-client and rape-shield problems, we likely could have detected a significant effect in this problem. This likelihood drops to
56.5% and 20.5% for twenty- and ten-percentage-point differences, respectively.

256

See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 718 (1984) (“[I]f truly exigent circumstances exist no warrant is required under general Fourth Amendment principles.”).
257
See, e.g., Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970) (holding that police may
search automobiles based on probable cause without a warrant); see also United States
v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478, 487-88 (1985) (allowing police to search containers without a
warrant when the containers were properly seized from an automobile at an earlier
time).
258
Fisher’s exact p = .68.
259
This analysis assumes that the population percentage in foresight is 24%, which
is what we found.
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3. Hindsight and Probable Cause: Discussion
Our study produced no evidence that the hindsight bias affected
the judges’ assessments of probable cause. Knowledge of the fruits of
the search had no discernible effect on judges’ decision making.
Judges were able to ignore the damning evidence that the search produced and make essentially the same decision as judges who were unaware of what the search would uncover. The results also reveal only
the slightest trend towards a hindsight bias.
These results are somewhat surprising. The vast literature on the
hindsight bias includes virtually no studies that fail to uncover evidence of the hindsight bias in ex post assessments of ex ante probabilities. A handful of hindsight-bias studies report only non-significant
260
So what acdifferences between hindsight and foresight conditions.
counts for our findings? It is possible that the facts we presented are
simply anomalous, but we doubt it. The circumstances presented
closely match the kinds of situations that produce the hindsight bias.
The materials asked judges in hindsight to assess how events must
have seemed to the police officer beforehand. The materials also include some ambiguous facts that could easily be reinterpreted as more
sinister after one learns what the fruits of the search were. These circumstances produced the hindsight bias in numerous other studies.
Nor do we think that judges have necessarily learned how to avoid
the hindsight bias. As noted, several other studies show judges are in261
fluenced by hindsight bias in other situations. Furthermore, we did
not observe any effect of experience on the bias. That result undermines the suggestion that judges eventually learn how to make decisions without being influenced by the hindsight bias in general.
One possibility is that “probable cause” assessments do not actually
depend upon the likelihood that a search produces incriminating evidence. Rather, probable cause assessments might reflect a judicial effort to identify police conduct thought to be socially appropriate.
Thus, the court simply evaluates whether the conduct is appropriate
or excessive. If so, the results of our study are still surprising. It is
hard to imagine that the likelihood that the search would produce incriminating evidence is somehow unrelated to the assessment of
whether the police engaged in a socially appropriate search. Fur260

See Rachlinski, supra note 77, at 580-81 (reviewing previous research on the
hindsight bias).
261
See supra notes 246-47 and accompanying text.
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thermore, a judgment of appropriate police conduct would also seem
likely to be influenced by the outcome of the search.
Another possibility is that judges have developed informal heuris262
tics which they use to assess probable cause. Perhaps judges do not
attempt to assess probable cause de novo every time they encounter a
probable cause issue. Rather, they may have rules of thumb for determining probable cause that address common situations, such as
vague assertions by police officers that they thought they smelled
drugs. Some judges might have just developed the habit of refusing to
grant warrants, or admitting evidence seized after a search, when the
only real basis for probable cause consists of such an assertion. If
judges adopt a set of simple, uncomplicated heuristics to assess probable cause, they might not be so easily swayed by the outcome of the
search. Sorting out these issues will require further study.
G. Inadmissible Criminal Confession
Our final scenario explores whether judges can disregard information gleaned from an inadmissible confession in a criminal case. In its
263
264
famous Miranda and Escobedo decisions, the Supreme Court interpreted the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination as
providing several procedural safeguards to criminal suspects. Among
them is the requirement that once a suspect in custody requests a lawyer, the police must cease interrogation. If the police continue with
265
the interrogation, the resulting confession is inadmissible.
Judges often confront an uncomfortable reality when sitting in a
case involving an illegally obtained confession. Under Miranda and
Escobedo, the judge has an obligation to suppress the confession, but
because the confession is often among the most important pieces of
evidence against the defendant, the act of suppressing the confession
may undermine the prosecution’s case against him. Thus, we expect
that it will be difficult for judges to ignore the suppressed confession.

262

In a different context, Hillary Sale has argued that judges have developed simple heuristics to guide their decision making in securities fraud cases. Hillary A. Sale,
Judging Heuristics, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 903, 904-05 (2002).
263
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
264
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
265
See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45 (“If . . . he indicates in any manner and at any
stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there
can be no questioning.”).
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Most prior studies indicate that mock jurors commonly ignore in266
In particustructions to disregard constitutionally infirm evidence.
lar, mock jurors pay attention to the details of coerced confessions,
regardless of whether the evidence had been deemed constitutionally
infirm and inadmissible. To be sure, extreme police conduct does in267
crease the extent to which mock jurors can discount such evidence.
Likewise, a series of studies of the influence of illegal wiretaps on verdicts reveals that mock jurors have some ability to discount such evi268
So to some degree, even mock jurors seem able to account
dence.
for constitutional constraints. But on the whole, mock jurors seem
willing to convict defendants they perceive to be guilty, even if the
damning evidence is deemed inadmissible for extrinsic constitutional
269
reasons.
1. Inadmissible Criminal Confession: The Scenario
To assess whether judges can ignore such constitutionally infirm
evidence, we created a scenario entitled “Evaluation of a Robbery
270
271
Trial.” In this scenario, the participating judges learn that they are
presiding in a bench trial involving a criminal prosecution for armed
robbery. Bench trials are not the norm in criminal cases, but they do
272
occur. We provided the judges with an explanation for why the defendant sought a bench trial in this case: “Concerned that he is a
266

See Saul M. Kassin & Holly Sukel, Coerced Confessions and the Jury: An Experimental
Test of the “Harmless Error” Rule, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 27, 42 (1997) (stating that the
presence of a confession “powerfully increased the conviction rate,” even when mock
jurors were told to disregard the confession because it was coerced); Kassin &
Wrightsman, supra note 94, at 504 (concluding that instructions to disregard coerced
confessions may not be effective).
267
See Kassin & Wrightsman, supra note 94, at 491, 496 (citing studies that show
people are less likely to disregard negative inducement of confessions, and finding that
people view negatively induced confessions as less voluntary than positively induced
ones).
268
Kassin & Sommers, supra note 86, at 1047-53; Sommers & Kassin, supra note 97,
at 1372-73; Werner, Kagehiro & Strube, supra note 95, at 631-32.
269
See Kassin & Sommers, supra note 86, at 1051 (asserting that experimental results suggest that jurors are influenced not by a judge’s ruling per se, but by the causal
basis for that ruling).
270
Infra Appendix, pp. 1344-45.
271
We gave this scenario to all of the judges who attended the conference in Maricopa County. Supra Table 1, p. 1285.
272
See MECHAM, supra note 109, at 162-64 tbl.C-7 (reporting 3618 nonjury trials in
criminal cases and 3500 jury trials between September 2002 and September 2003 in
federal court).
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member of a small minority in the community and will face an unsympathetic jury, Mr. Jones has waived his right to a jury trial. You are
273
thus presiding in a bench trial.”
The judges learn that the perpetrator, wearing a ski mask and
brandishing a gun, walked into an empty 7-Eleven store at night and
demanded that the lone employee place money in a shopping bag.
The cashier stuffed $200 into the bag, and the perpetrator ran off,
discarding both the gun and ski mask on the way out. The cashier observed that the suspect got into a white Ford Taurus with an Arizona
license plate bearing “GB” as the last two characters. The police retrieved the gun and mask but could obtain no fingerprints from them.
The police surveyed the neighborhood for a matching car. They
found one ten blocks away that was a close match (the last two characters of the license plate on the Ford Taurus were “C8”). The police
traced the car through the Department of Motor Vehicles and found
the address of the owner. They knocked on the door of his apartment, and he answered. He matched the build and race of the perpetrator and was wearing similar clothes (although this consisted of jeans
and a white t-shirt). The police then insisted that he accompany them
to the station house where they led him to a locked room, read him
his Miranda rights, and began interrogating him. At the police station, they allowed the cashier to listen in on the interrogation, and the
274
cashier said, “that sounds like the guy.” The police then arrested the
defendant and obtained a warrant to search his apartment. The
search produced shopping bags similar to the one used by the perpetrator, black gloves, and more than $200 in cash, but nothing else incriminating.
In addition to the aforementioned information, the judges assigned to the suppression condition learn the following:
The police continued questioning the defendant. Even though the defendant clearly requested a lawyer, twice, the police refused to call one
and continued the interrogation. Two hours later, the defendant confessed, and agreed to write out a description of the crime. His written
description matched the events perfectly, including the fact that he discarded the ski mask and gun outside the store (which the police had not
275
told him).

273
274
275

Infra Appendix, p. 1344.
Infra Appendix, p. 1344.
Infra Appendix, p. 1345.
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The materials stated that “the defendant’s attorney has moved to
suppress the confession, arguing that the interrogation violated the
defendant’s rights under Miranda by continuing after the defendant
276
The judges in the suppression condihad requested an attorney.”
tion were then asked whether they would grant the motion to suppress
the evidence. Finally, the materials in both the control and suppression conditions asked the judges to respond to the following question:
“Based solely on the evidence admitted at trial, would you convict the
277
defendant?”
2. Inadmissible Criminal Confession: The Results
In the control condition, 17.7% (9 out of 51) of the judges convicted the defendant. In the suppression condition, 20.7% (11 out of
53) of the judges who suppressed the confession convicted the defen278
dant. The responses of the judges in these two groups were not sta279
tistically significantly different from one another.
Logistic regression of the decision on court, gender, experience and the interaction
of these variables with condition revealed no significant effects.
As with the probable cause scenario, the lack of a significant effect
might be attributable to the limited sample size, rather than to the
lack of any real difference. If the true difference were 30 percentage
points, however, our study had a 93.4% chance of producing a signifi280
cant or marginally significant effect.
This percentage drops to
67.1% and 25.6% for detecting differences of 10 and 20 percentage
points, respectively.
3. Inadmissible Criminal Confession: Discussion
The judges in this study appeared able to ignore the evidence of
the improperly obtained confession. The differences between the
control and the suppression conditions were barely distinguishable.
The judges were able to uphold the policies underlying the Miranda
doctrine and ignore the incriminating but inadmissible evidence.

276

Infra Appendix, p. 1345.
Infra Appendix, p. 1345.
278
Only one of the 54 judges assigned to the experimental condition ruled that
the confession was admissible.
279
Fisher’s exact p = .69.
280
This analysis assumes that 17% is the true conviction percentage in the control
condition.
277
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These materials might be idiosyncratic, but we suspect they are
not. The confession in our materials was not an unreliable product of
coercion; it included information that was known only to the perpetrator, indicating that the defendant had in fact committed the robbery. It could be that the judges missed this important fact, because
the materials do not highlight it. We did not ask the judges to assess
the likelihood that the defendant actually committed the crime, which
would have enabled us to measure this directly. In our other scenarios, however—particularly the sexual assault scenario—important details did not escape the judges’ notice and instead had a powerful effect on their judgment. We have no reason to think that judges failed
to notice this fact.
It appears instead that the judges simply managed to ignore the
tainted evidence. The scenario includes ambiguities that provided
plenty of fodder for reconstructing or justifying a guilty verdict. Not
only were the judges able to disregard their knowledge that the defendant was guilty, they were also able to keep that information from
coloring their assessment of the other facts. How they did this is unclear. It might be that judges were simply compensating for their own
knowledge. Perhaps judges, aware that their thinking was influenced
by the inadmissible confession, implicitly raised the threshold for their
willingness to convict. Even as their knowledge influenced their understanding of the ambiguous facts, the judges also demanded more
certainty. Further study is necessary to sort this out.
Compared with other scenarios, this scenario and the hindsight
bias scenario raise more serious questions about the applicability of
our results to the real world. It might be easy enough in hypothetical
assessments to assert that an important constitutional principle would
prevent one from convicting a defendant. Exonerating a real, live defendant that a judge knows to be guilty might be a more serious matter. Judges, however, do this when they rule critical evidence inadmissible on constitutional grounds in jury trials, knowing full well that the
ruling will destroy the prosecution’s case. Whether judges ignore
their knowledge of inadmissible evidence in deciding real cases remains uncertain. These results indicate, however, that judges might
have more ability to ignore such evidence than intuition might suggest.
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H. Summary and Interpretation
In our previous article on federal magistrate judges, we demonstrated that judges, like laypersons and other expert decision makers,
are subject to “heuristics and biases” or “cognitive illusions” when
281
making judgments. Based on the research we conducted for that article, we reached the unsurprising conclusion that “[j]udges . . . are
282
The research we report in this Article corroborates that
human.”
conclusion. Judges are indeed human; like jurors, they are often un283
able to “close the [v]alves of [their] attention.”
Taken together, our studies show that judges do not disregard inadmissible information when making substantive decisions in either
civil or criminal cases. We think the reason is that they are unwittingly
influenced by inadmissible information and that they cannot ignore it
much of the time. Others might argue that our studies show that
judges are capable of disregarding inadmissible information but that
they choose not to do so. They might claim that judges purposefully
flout the evidentiary rules in favor of selecting the substantive outcome that they think is just or that comports with their personal policy
preferences. In the rape-shield problem we describe above, for example, the judges who learned of the victim’s sexual history were much
more likely than the judges who did not learn this information to free
284
While we believe that these
the defendant from criminal liability.
results show that judges had difficulty ignoring the inadmissible sexual
history, and that their exposure to it induced them to exonerate the
defendant, it is also possible that the judges were capable of disregarding this information but chose not to do so because they felt that justice required them to free the defendant from criminal liability.
Although this alternative account is plausible, we think it is less
compelling than our own interpretation for several reasons. First, the
weight of psychological evidence—from general psychological studies,
mock juror studies, and the one prior study of judges—suggests that
people in general have great difficulty deliberately disregarding information. Second, although we do not consider ourselves naïve, we

281

See generally Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, supra note 108 (noting that five different “illusions”—anchoring, framing, hindsight bias, the representative heuristic, and
egocentric biases—all had significant impacts on judicial decision making).
282
Id. at 821.
283
EMILY DICKINSON, COMPLETE POEMS, No. 303 (Thomas H. Johnson ed., 1970).
284
See supra Part III.C.
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are inclined to believe that trial judges generally attempt to comply with
the evidentiary rules rather than merely selecting the substantive outcome they prefer. Finally, we think our interpretation is more consistent with our results. Take, for example, the settlement scenario we
285
described above. We believe the only sensible interpretation of this
study is that the judges were unable to disregard the settlement demands when they set damages in the case; it strains credulity to think
that they could have ignored the demands but chose instead to award
less in the low-anchor condition and more in the high-anchor condition to pursue a (nonobvious) sense of justice.
The pattern of results we observed in these seven scenarios defies
easy explanation. One might be tempted to assert that judicial solicitude for constitutional rights explains the results in the last two scenarios, both of which had constitutional dimensions. We doubt, however, that judges take constitutionally inspired rules of admissibility
any more or less seriously than the non-constitutionally inspired rules
implicated by our other problems. Certainly, it is hard to see why
judges would treat the attorney-client privilege with any less care than
Miranda violations.
Alternatively, it also appears that judges were less able to ignore
inadmissible evidence when they were making factual determinations
that were less amenable to judicial review. In the first five scenarios,
the inadmissible evidence supported: lower or higher damage awards,
a judgment for the defense in a civil case, an acquittal in a criminal
case, and a longer criminal sentence. Some of these issues are not
even subject to appeal, and the others would result in reversals only in
extraordinary circumstances. By contrast, in the two scenarios in
which the judge ignored the inadmissible evidence, it supported a
finding of probable cause for a search in a criminal case and a guilty
verdict in a criminal case. Both constitute decisions that are likely to
be appealed and possibly overturned if deemed erroneous. Thus,
judges were more likely to be influenced by inadmissible information
if appellate review was deferential or unlikely. Whether this theory
truly explains the pattern of results, however, would require more
data.

285

See supra Part III.A.
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IV. PRESCRIPTIONS
We are somewhat reluctant to make policy recommendations on
the basis of the limited data we have collected for this Article. Our
findings do raise important questions for the justice system, however.
Judges are the key players in this system. They decide a sizable per286
centage of civil cases at trial, and they decide many more cases on
287
motion than they do at trial. If their judgments at trial and their decisions on motions are tainted by inadmissible evidence, the fairness
of the justice system may be undermined.
We believe our results support the following three policy recommendations.
A. Separating “Managerial Judging” from Adjudication
We first propose that courts should separate judges’ “manage288
rial” functions from their “adjudicative” functions as a way of reducing the likelihood that judges will be influenced by inadmissible evidence they encounter during pretrial proceedings when making
289
merits-based decisions on motions or at trial. Courts, in other words,
should adopt a kind of divided decision making. For example, courts
might emulate the allocation of tasks in some federal district courts in
which magistrate judges resolve discovery disputes and conduct settlement conferences while the district judges decide substantive motions and preside over trials as the fact finders. This could be done
whether there are two types of judges, or just one. Two judges could
be assigned to each case, with one judge addressing the merits and the
other judge deciding everything else. They could then swap roles on
alternating cases.
Alternatively, courts could divide case management into several
subparts, such as litigation motions, settlement, and trial, and assign
286

See supra note 109.
See Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REV. 1093,
1100 n.17 (1996) (citing a study where 24% of the 1649 federal and state cases were
terminated by some form of adjudication other than trial, such as arbitration or dismissal on the merits).
288
See Resnik, supra note 34, at 386 (describing managerial judging as involvement,
for example, in pretrial case development).
289
See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 22, § 22.91, at 446-47 (“Judges who have
been involved in unsuccessful settlement negotiations sometimes turn over to another
judge the responsibility for trying the case because they have been privy to information
on the merits of the case or on issues that would otherwise not have been revealed.”).
287
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290

judges to each task for all cases. Such “master calendar” systems are
common in many state courts and were common in the federal courts
291
Finally, courts might adopt rules prohibiting
until the late 1960s.
the judge assigned to try the case from participating in settlement
conferences involving that case. Indeed, various courts, in largely
292
piecemeal fashion, have adopted each of these reforms.
This approach to the “difficulty of deliberately disregarding” problem is not without its costs. In the normal course in federal court,
judges are assigned to particular cases and oversee them from beginning to end. This is efficient in that one judge is familiar with the
facts, applicable law, procedural history, relationship between the par293
ties, and so forth. Under a system of divided decision making, a different judge might resolve a discovery dispute, rule on a pretrial motion, supervise settlement, and try the case. Each of those judges
would have to get up to speed on the case, at least well enough to resolve whatever matters are in front of that particular judge.
Still, the benefits of this approach might outweigh its costs. This
approach would dramatically decrease, though certainly not eliminate,
the likelihood that a trial judge rendering a merits-based decision
would have been exposed to inadmissible information before trial.
294
Consider, for example, the settlement scenario we described above.
If that dispute had been litigated in a court characterized by the kind
290

See Hon. James M. Carter, Effective Calendar Control—Objectives and Methods, 29
F.R.D. 227, 237-40 (1961) (describing the principal advantages and disadvantages of
master calendar systems and individual assignment calendar systems).
291
See Richard L. Marcus, Slouching Toward Discretion, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1561, 1587 (2003) (describing the trend from master calendars to single-judge assignment).
292
See, e.g., E.D. CAL. L.R. 72-302(c)(1) (referring all discovery motions to magistrate judges); N.D. CAL. ADR L.R. 7-2 (“A settlement conference generally will be conducted by a Magistrate Judge, but in some limited circumstances may be conducted by
a District Judge. Upon written stipulation of all parties, the assigned Judge . . . may
conduct a settlement conference.”); see also Harold Baer, Jr., History, Process, and a Role
for Judges in Mediating Their Own Cases, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURVEY AM. L. 131, 144-47
(2001) (explaining a “central criticism of judicial mediation . . . that, not only is it a
waste of resources for a federal judge to act as mediator, but it is also unethical for a
judge to mediate a case that appears on his own docket”).
293
See Committee on the Federal Courts of the Association of the Bar of the City of
New York, Report Evaluating the Individual Assignment System in the Southern District of New
York After Three Years Experience, 69 F.R.D. 493, 497 (1976) (attributing a nearly 40% reduction in civil caseload over a three-year period to the conversion of the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York to an individual assignment system).
294
See supra Part III.A.
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of divided decision making we are proposing here, plaintiff’s counsel
would have voiced his client’s demands not to the eventual trial judge,
but rather to a settlement judge. Thus, the trial judge would have
made her damage award without having been exposed to the inadmissible settlement demand.
B. Further Justification for the Jury Trial
We also recommend that jurisdictions favor another form of divided decision making. Juries have been the targets of much criticism,
295
especially in recent years.
The data we report in this Article, however, suggest that even if these criticisms are valid, other reasons support continued reliance on jury trials rather than bench trials. In our
earlier study of judges, we made a similar recommendation, arguing
that “those clamoring for judges to replace juries should proceed with
caution” because juries may be able to make better decisions than
296
judges in some circumstances. Here, we reiterate that recommendation, though we do so on a slightly different basis.
Both jurors and judges are likely to have difficulty disregarding inadmissible evidence, but judges presiding in a jury trial can protect juries from encountering inadmissible evidence in a way that they cannot protect themselves. Most obviously, jurors will never be exposed
to the inadmissible evidence that judges encounter during the pretrial
phase of litigation. Moreover, even during the trial itself, judges have
procedural devices at their disposal, such as in camera review, to enable
them to review potentially inadmissible evidence outside the presence
of the jury. In short, the exclusionary rules operate best in a system of
divided decision making in which the judge serves as gatekeeper and
the jury serves as fact finder.
As a related matter, these results suggest that clear rules of evidence (such as the blanket prohibition on admissibility of privileged
information, absent crime or fraud) have an advantage over standards
for admissibility (such as the rule allowing old criminal convictions to
be admitted if they are highly relevant). Standards encourage parties
295

See, e.g., Thomas A. Eaton, Susette M. Talarico & Richard E. Dunn, Another Brick
in the Wall: An Empirical Look at Georgia Tort Litigation in the 1990s, 34 GA. L. REV. 1049,
1097 (2000) (noting the juries have been “the target of much criticism by proponents
of tort reform”); Michael J. Saks, Public Opinion About the Civil Jury: Can Reality Be Found
in the Illusions?, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 221, 233-34 (1998) (discussing attacks on the jury
system by well-funded interest groups).
296
Guthrie, Rachlinski & Wistrich, supra note 108, at 827.
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to present evidence to the judge in an effort to have it admitted,
whereas rules might discourage such activity. Consequently, standards
for admissibility will force judges to review more evidence, and possibly be affected by it regardless of whether it is admitted, than clear
rules would.
C. Establishing Guidelines for Civil Damages
Third, and finally, we worry that judges might be particularly vulnerable to the inappropriate influence of inadmissible information
when assessing damages. Judges supervising settlement conferences,
for instance, might inadvertently be exposed to inadmissible anchors,
like settlement demands or insurance policy limits, or to other inadmissible information that might influence their assessment of damages, like whether the defendant in a tort suit has taken subsequent
remedial measures. This is of particular concern when judges must
award damages that are inherently difficult to quantify, such as “pain
and suffering” damages or punitive damages. These kinds of damages
seem particularly vulnerable to untoward influences such as anchor297
ing. Others have expressed the concern that these influences affect
298
juries; our results suggest that judges are also vulnerable. The results we report in this Article provide an argument for limiting the fact
finder’s discretion in this area, whether that fact finder is a judge or a
jury.
Judges, like jurors, are vulnerable to inappropriate influences on
their determination of damage awards. In our earlier works and here,
we observed both enormous variation in the damage awards that
judges felt to be appropriate and the undesirable influence of anchoring. We recommend that legislatures or courts adopt damage schedules, akin to criminal sentencing guidelines, to structure and confine
judicial discretion. Our goal is not “tort reform”; we are not advocating damage caps. Nor are we advocating ranges so narrow or inflexible that they unduly deprive judges and juries of their discretion.
Rather, we suggest that jurisdictions adopt guidelines to inform factfinder discretion in awarding damages in order to prevent or limit the

297

See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, REID HASTIE, JOHN W. PAYNE, DAVID A. SCHKADE & W. KIP
VISCUSI, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: HOW JURIES DECIDE 244-48 (2002) (discussing the effect
of anchoring on punitive damages).
298
Id.
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extent of distortions resulting from limitations on human cognitive
299
ability.
The research on anchoring, in fact, provides insights into the potential value of even a nonbinding damage schedule, akin to workers’
compensation systems. The inappropriate influence of anchoring
arises from the arbitrary nature of some anchors available to trial
judges as they determine the appropriate damage award. Damage requests by attorneys are self-serving, awards in past cases can be idiosyncratic, and reliance on numbers discussed during settlement talks
can undermine the settlement process. Damage awards taken from
an agreed schedule, however, would ideally represent a consensus view
of an appropriate award and hence would inject a meaningful anchor
into the process. Judges could use a damage schedule as a starting
point and then adjust as may be appropriate.
What we propose for civil damages, in effect, is adoption of something like the federal criminal sentencing system as it exists today, af300
ter the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Booker. As Justice
Breyer explained in a separate opinion, the Court in Booker only declared the sentencing guidelines unconstitutional to the extent that
301
Federal district
they are binding on a sentencing judge’s decision.
judges must still calculate the guidelines range in determining crimi302
The guidelines will, in effect, provide a meaningful
nal sentences.
anchor to guide sentencing. A similar procedure would provide
greater predictability and equity to damage determinations in civil
cases.
CONCLUSION
Some of the changes to the rules of evidence and procedure suggested by empirical research in psychology may seem too novel or
costly to be considered seriously. As we learn more about human de-

299

See Sunstein, Kahneman, Schkade & Ritov, supra note 146, at 1183 (suggesting
that the remedy for bias is the adoption of guidelines).
300
125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).
301
Id. at 764 (Breyer, J., opinion of the Court in part) (“[W]e must sever and excise two specific statutory provisions: the provision that requires sentencing courts to
impose a sentence within the applicable Guidelines range . . . and the provision that
sets forth standards of review on appeal, including de novo review of departures from
the applicable Guidelines range . . . .” (emphasis omitted)).
302
Id. at 767 (“The district courts, while not bound to apply the Guidelines, must
consult those Guidelines and take them into account when sentencing.”).
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cision making and the operation of our justice system, however, it is
likely that we will eventually accept the need for fine-tuning, and perhaps even significant changes. As Professor Damaška has observed:
As science continues to change the social world, greater transformations
of factual inquiry lie ahead for all justice systems. These transformations
could turn out to be as momentous as those that occurred in the twilight
of the Middle Ages, when magical forms of proof retreated before the
303
prototypes of our present evidentiary technology.

Of course, it would be prudent to conduct further research before
significant changes are made. As studies of jury decision making have
shown, well-intentioned efforts to solve problems may be ineffective,
304
and sometimes only succeed in making the problem worse. In addition, because the rules of evidence and procedure are merely parts of
the larger legal system, the collateral consequences of tinkering with
some parts while leaving others untouched must be taken into ac305
count. If the results of existing research are confirmed, however, we
may have a responsibility to make the changes sooner rather than
later. Judicial decisions have serious consequences for litigants, and
undue delay in eliminating sources of error would undermine our
306
Litigants, courts,
commitment to accurate and just adjudication.
and the community as a whole can only benefit if legal procedures are
updated to keep pace with progress in the understanding of human
decision making.
The results of our studies show that judges frequently cannot
307
“close the valves of [their] attention.” The presumption that people

303

DAMAŠKA, supra note 1, at 151; see also Julius Stone, The Decline of Jury Trial and
the Law of Evidence, 3 RES JUDICATAE 144, 148 (1947) (describing the “overhaul” of the
evidence rules, “in the light of changing methods of trial,” as “the major task of our
century in this branch of the law”).
304
Broeder, supra note 79, at 753-54.
305
See Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 486 (1948) (noting that much of
the law regarding evidence and good character is “archaic, paradoxical and full of
compromises and compensations by which a rational advantage to one side is offset by
a poorly reasoned counterprivilege to the other,” but “somehow it has proved a workable even if clumsy system when moderated by discretionary controls in the hands of a
wise and strong trial court,” and pulling “one misshapen stone out of the grotesque
structure” would more likely “upset its present balance” than “establish a rational edifice”).
306
See FED. R. EVID. 102 (describing the purpose of the Federal Rules of Evidence
as promoting “the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined”).
307
See supra note 283.
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can ignore what they know, or use it for some purposes but not for
other purposes, may sometimes be true, but often is little more than a
308
This may mean that judicial decision making is
convenient fiction.
not as accurate as we hope it is. The time has come to start thinking
about how we are going to solve that problem.

308

See LON L. FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS 9 (1967) (“A fiction is either (1) a statement propounded with a complete or partial consciousness of its falsity, or (2) a false
statement recognized as having utility.”).
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APPENDIX: STIMULUS MATERIALS
Assessment of Damages
Imagine that you are presiding over an automobile accident case
in which the parties have agreed to a bench trial. The plaintiff is a 31year-old male schoolteacher and the defendant is a large packagedelivery service. The plaintiff was sideswiped by a truck driven erratically by one of the defendant’s drivers. As a result of the accident, the
plaintiff broke three ribs and severely injured his right arm. He spent
a week in the hospital, and missed six weeks of work. The injuries to
his right arm were so severe as to require amputation. (He was righthanded.)
The parties have stipulated that the accident was caused solely by
the negligent driving of the defendant’s employee. The parties have
settled the plaintiff’s claim for medical expenses, and the plaintiff’s
economic claims for lost wages and the like. The only remaining issue
in the lawsuit is the amount of damages the plaintiff should receive for
pain and suffering and the loss of his right arm.
In an effort to settle the case, the parties requested that you preside over a settlement conference before the commencement of the
trial. During the settlement conference, the plaintiff’s attorney confided in you that his client [Low anchor version and its control: could use
the money and wanted to eliminate any possibility of an appeal. / High
anchor version and its control: was intent upon collecting a significant
monetary payment.] [Low anchor version: He stated that his client
would be willing to settle for $175,000.] [High anchor version: He
stated that his client would not be willing to settle for less than
$10,000,000.] Nevertheless, the parties were unable to reach a settlement and the case proceeded to trial. The settlement discussions are,
of course, not admissible evidence at trial under Rule ___ of the ___
Rules of Evidence.
The evidence presented at trial included testimony from the
plaintiff, a young father, that he could no longer play recreational
softball, or even play catch with his son. Although the plaintiff has
continued teaching, he testified that doing his job is somewhat more
difficult, and that he is subject to periodic ridicule by the students.
Plaintiff also described the severe pain he endured before arriving at
the hospital, during the surgery to amputate his arm, and during his
post-surgical therapy.
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Although both parties presented arguments, neither suggested a
specific figure, leaving the amount to be awarded entirely up to you.
How much would you award plaintiff for pain and suffering and loss
of his right arm?
$_______________________
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Evaluation of a Contract Dispute
Suppose that you are presiding over a bench trial in a case in
which the plaintiff, John Jones, is suing SmithFilms for breach of contract. Jones was hired by SmithFilms as an independent contractor to
assist SmithFilms in making a movie. The contract between the parties consists of a one-page letter signed by Jones and Stan Smith, the
president of SmithFilms. The letter simply recites that Jones will provide various services to SmithFilms, that Jones will continue to be paid
a monthly salary as an independent contractor until the film is released, and that Jones will receive such other consideration as was
agreed upon by the parties during the pre-signing breakfast.
SmithFilms and Jones agree on everything that was discussed at
the breakfast except whether SmithFilms would give plaintiff producer
credit. Jones contends that Smith promised him producer credit and
SmithFilms denies this. Both agree that Jones’ efforts turned out to be
an invaluable part of the film’s production and were in no small
measure responsible for the film’s ultimate commercial success. Jones
is seeking damages arising from SmithFilm’s refusal to give him producer credit.
***
[Suppression Materials: Prior to trial, the parties became embroiled
in a discovery dispute. The dispute concerned a request by SmithFilms that Jones produce an audiotape which Jones made of a confidential telephone conversation with Greg Gonzalez, an attorney,
shortly after the contract was signed. (Gonzales is not representing
Jones in this lawsuit.) SmithFilms argued that Gonzalez may have
been giving Jones business rather than legal advice. To resolve the
dispute, the parties requested that you listen to the audiotape in camera. You do so. At one point in the tape recorded conversation, the
following statements were made:
Jones: I really needed this deal and I was afraid that asking for producer
credit might be a turn-off, so I got nervous and did not ask for it. But I
meant to. I need your legal opinion, Greg. Suppose that I send Smith a
letter now saying that I meant for producer credit to be part of the deal.
Would that be legally binding?
Gonzalez: No. If you and Smith did not agree on producer credit during breakfast, you don’t have a leg to stand on. A letter now won’t help.
Jones: Darn. That’s a shame.
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The rest of the audiotape confirms that Gonzalez was functioning
solely in a legal capacity.
How would you rule on a motion to compel production of the audiotape? (check one)
___ I would grant the motion.
___ I would deny the motion.]
***
At trial, Jones testified that during their breakfast meeting, Smith
agreed that SmithFilms would give Jones producer credit. He also
called as a witness the woman who was their waitress during the breakfast meeting. She testified that she thought that she heard one of the
parties say the words, “you can have producer credit.” On cross examination, she admitted that she had trouble remembering the breakfast and was not 100% certain of this. Smith had suffered a severe
stroke just before his deposition was taken and he has been unavailable to testify ever since. SmithFilms offered evidence that SmithFilms
usually did not give producer credit to independent contractors.
How would you decide this case (check one):
____ For Jones, because Smith agreed to give Jones producer
credit during their meeting.
____ For SmithFilms, because Smith did not agree to give Jones
producer credit during their meeting.
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Evaluation of a Criminal Case
Imagine that you are presiding over a bench trial in which Mr.
Geiger has been charged with sexual assault. The evidence presented
at trial is summarized below:
Mr. Geiger is a senior at a local university, as is the complainant,
Ms. Smith. Several months ago, Ms. Smith and her new fiancé attended a party hosted by Mr. Geiger’s fraternity. Several witnesses reported that they saw Ms. Smith drinking heavily at the party. Witnesses also reported seeing Mr. Geiger and Ms. Smith talking and
drinking together and that at one point, Mr. Geiger seemed to help
Ms. Smith “walk” or “stagger” into Mr. Geiger’s room. The two had
never met before. Apparently, Ms. Smith’s fiancé began looking for
her and was told that she was in Mr. Geiger’s room. He entered Mr.
Geiger’s room where he discovered Mr. Geiger on top of Ms. Smith;
her skirt was pulled up over her waist. He pulled Mr. Geiger off of Ms.
Smith, threw him onto the floor, and then stormed off. Ms. Smith got
up and ran after him.
A campus police officer testified that two hours after these events,
Ms. Smith appeared at the campus police station and charged that she
had been raped by Mr. Geiger in his room. She reported to the police
that she had been drinking heavily and that Mr. Geiger agreed to help
her into his room because she had become dizzy and needed to lie
down. Then, she claimed, he forced himself on her. She told police
that she clearly refused to consent to sexual intercourse and shouted
“no” a couple of times, but Mr. Geiger held her down and continued.
According to the police officer, Smith became visibly upset while recounting her story. A physical examination revealed bruises on her
upper thighs.
Ms. Smith’s fiancé testified that he had initially thought that Ms.
Smith’s encounter with Mr. Geiger may have been consensual, but
that several days later, Ms. Smith convinced him that it was not. They
had just gotten engaged a few days before the party and still plan to
get married after college. He claims that before the incident, Ms.
Smith was cheerful and extroverted, while now Ms. Smith seems
moody and depressed. He asserted that she often bursts into tears for
no reason and is afraid to attend social gatherings.
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***
[Suppression Materials: In his defense, Mr. Geiger is trying to introduce testimony from five other students, 3 male and 2 female, that Ms.
Smith had a well-deserved reputation for being sexually promiscuous.
This includes one of Ms. Smith’s best friends who will testify that before Ms. Smith met her fiancé, she “had trouble remembering what
fraternity house she woke up in each Sunday morning.” Another witness, a former roommate of Ms. Smith, will assert that Ms. Smith
“liked to loosen her inhibitions with a few beers too many and then
have rough sex with the first guy she saw.” The prosecution has
moved to exclude such evidence on the ground that it violates Arizona’s “Rape Shield” statute (section 13-1421 of the Arizona Criminal
Code) which forbids the introduction of evidence concerning a victim’s “chastity” or “reputation for chastity” in cases involving sexual assault.
How would you rule?
____ This testimony is admissible.
____ This testimony is not admissible.]
***
Mr. Geiger testified in his own defense. He admitted having intercourse with Ms. Smith, but he contends that she consented to the
encounter. He admitted to having intercourse with seven different
women during his time at college, most of which were one-time encounters at parties. He denied that he has ever had sex without a
woman’s consent.
Based solely on the evidence admitted at trial, would you find Mr.
Geiger guilty of sexual assault?
Yes

No
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Assessment of Pain and Suffering Damages
You are presiding over a bench trial in a civil case. The facts are as
follows:
The plaintiff is Bill Post, a single, 35-year-old automobile mechanic.
On February 20, 2001, Mr. Post slipped while operating a riding [lawnmower/snowblower] on a steep driveway. The [mower/blower] tipped
onto him, severely damaging his left arm. (Mr. Post is right handed.)
Although the [mower/blower] was equipped with a kill-switch that
should have turned the [mower/blower] off when it tipped, the switch
malfunctioned.
The manufacturer, [Lawn/Snow] King, Inc., admitted that the
kill-switch contained a manufacturing defect and admitted that it was
liable to Mr. Post. The parties settled on amounts for medical expenses and lost wages, but could not agree on compensatory damages
for pain, suffering, and loss of enjoyment of life. This amount is the
only issue to be resolved at trial.
During the trial, Mr. Post presented testimony from a surgeon
about the three lengthy operations that were required to repair the
damage to Post’s shoulder and arm, and from a rehabilitation specialist about Post’s bi-weekly physical therapy sessions. Both agreed that
Mr. Post’s condition is unlikely to improve. Although his left arm did
not have to be amputated, the nerves and muscles were so badly damaged that it is essentially useless.
Mr. Post testified about the incident, as well as about the continuing pain in his arm, the loss of his job, the frustration of adapting to
life with just one usable arm, and the nature and extent of his pain
and resulting total disability. Among other things, Mr. Post testified
that he had to take prescription narcotic pain medication continuously.
***
[Suppression Materials: During its brief cross-examination of Mr.
Post, [Lawn/Snow] King sought to introduce evidence of Post’s four
prior felony convictions. Specifically, Mr. Post had been convicted of
swindling schemes in which he obtained the life savings of elderly retirees by falsely promising them exorbitant rates of return, and then
using their money to pay his living expenses. His most recent conviction was fourteen years ago, and he had spent two years in prison for
this conviction. [Lawn/Snow] King concedes that pursuant to Rule
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609 of the Arizona Rules of Evidence, the evidence of Post’s prior
convictions is admissible only to impeach his credibility. Mr. Post objected to admitting this evidence, even with a limiting instruction. He
contended that “the probative value of the conviction” does not “substantially outweigh its prejudicial effect” as required by Rule 609(b) of
the Arizona Rules of Evidence (which governs the admission of criminal convictions more than 10 years old).
How would you rule on the plaintiff’s objection?
_____ Overrule the objection and allow the plaintiff to be impeached with his prior convictions.
_____ Sustain the objection and exclude the evidence of the
plaintiff’s prior convictions.]
***
[Lawn/Snow] King argued that the plaintiff was exaggerating his
injury. The company presented testimony from a physical and occupational therapist who had treated many people with injuries similar
to those suffered by Mr. Post. This expert testified that such people
usually can control their pain and lead relatively normal lives.
Based solely on the evidence admitted at trial, how much would
you award the plaintiff in compensatory damages?
$____________________
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Sentencing
Before you for sentencing is Sam Kaiser, who was found guilty of
possession of 150 grams of methamphetamine. The methamphetamine
was found in a jacket pocket after a legal search. At trial, Kaiser argued, unsuccessfully, that the jacket was not his.
According to the federal sentencing guidelines, possession of 150
grams of methamphetamine has a base offense level of 26.
Kaiser’s criminal history includes several convictions for larceny
and a minor drug possession. His total “criminal history points” sum
to 4, which puts him in category III for sentencing. Kaiser is 27 years
old, dropped out of high school when he was 17, has never held employment for very long, is not married, and has no children. He was
raised in poverty by a single mother, who did not appear on his behalf.
At offense level 26 and criminal history category III, the sentencing guidelines provide for a sentence of between 78 and 97 months.
After Kaiser’s conviction, he cooperated with the prosecution in
exchange for a recommendation that he be sent to a particular prison.
The prosecution agreed that none of the information he provided
would be used against him as long as he cooperated fully.
***
[Control: Kaiser revealed the name of his supplier, but nothing
else of substance.]
***
[Suppression: Kaiser revealed that he had helped his 30-year-old
cousin produce methamphetamine in a basement laboratory. Kaiser
also revealed that his cousin had a 15-year-old girlfriend who frequently “tried out” their batches for them.
The prosecution asked that you add 6 levels to Kaiser’s offense
level, pursuant to the sentencing guidelines, because he had been engaged in the manufacture of methamphetamine in a fashion that had
endangered a minor. Chapter 2D1.1(b)(4) of the federal sentencing
guidelines provides that if the offense “created a substantial risk of
harm to a minor, increase by 6 levels.” This would raise the sentence
to level 32. At offense level 32 and criminal history category III, the
sentencing guidelines provide for a sentence of between 151 and 188
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months. Kaiser’s attorney argued that the prosecution had agreed not
to use any of the information he provided against him.
Would you enhance the sentence level by 6 levels, as the prosecution requests?
Yes

No]
***

No other circumstances supporting any additional enhancements,
departures, or other adjustments are present.
What should Kaiser’s sentence consist of?
_____ months.
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Fourth Amendment Issue (Foresight-Warrant Condition)
[Foresight: Imagine that you have been asked to issue a telephonic
warrant authorizing Officer John Smoot to search the trunk of a
parked car. Here are the facts:]
[Hindsight: Imagine that you have been asked to rule on a motion
to suppress evidence obtained from a warrantless search of the trunk
of a parked car. Here are the facts:]
Officer Smoot was assigned to patrol public parking areas surrounding an arena holding a rock and roll concert. While cruising
the area, Officer Smoot noticed a well-dressed man exit a black BMW.
The man looked around nervously, opened his trunk, and fiddled
around with something in the trunk for a few seconds. After closing
the trunk and locking the car, the BMW driver met an apparent
friend, bought concert tickets at the ticket window, and entered the
arena to attend the concert.
About 30 minutes later, Officer Smoot drove past the BMW again
and noticed that the driver’s side window was open. Officer Smoot assumed the driver wouldn’t return to his car until the concert ended in
two or three hours, but he wasn’t entirely sure of this. Concerned that
the car might be easy prey for an enterprising car thief, Officer Smoot
parked his patrol car, got out, and went over to the BMW to roll up
the window.
Upon arriving at the BMW, Officer Smoot smelled something that
he believed, based on a demonstration at a training session several
years earlier, to be burnt methamphetamine. He looked inside the
car and didn’t see any drugs, but he did notice some Visine, a local
map, and a couple of empty beer cans.
[Hindsight: Based on these observations, Officer Smoot believed
that there was probable cause to search the trunk of the car. He
opened the trunk and found 10 pounds of methamphetamine, other
drug paraphernalia, and a gun that had recently been fired. Following the concert, one of Officer Smoot’s colleagues arrested the BMW
driver when he returned to his car.]
[Foresight: Based on these observations, Officer Smoot believes
there is probable cause to search the trunk of this car and has asked
you to issue a telephonic warrant authorizing the search. Will you issue the warrant?
_____ Yes, there is probable cause for the search; I would issue
the warrant.
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_____ No, there is not probable cause for the search; I would not
issue the warrant.]
[Hindsight: Subsequent investigative work revealed that the driver’s
fingerprints were on the gun and that this gun had been used earlier
in the day to kill a suspected drug dealer living on the other side of
the city. The BMW driver is now being prosecuted for murder, unlawful possession of a firearm, and several drug violations.
His defense attorney has filed a motion to suppress the evidence
obtained from the trunk on the ground that there was no probable
cause to conduct the search. Will you allow the evidence to be admitted?
_____ Yes, there was probable cause for the search; I would admit
the evidence.
_____ No, there was not probable cause for the search; I would
not allow the evidence to be admitted.]
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Evaluation of a Robbery Trial
Mr. Jones is on trial for armed robbery. Concerned that he is a
member of a small minority in the community and will face an unsympathetic jury, Mr. Jones has waived his right to a jury trial. You are
thus presiding in a bench trial. The following summarizes the evidence presented at trial:
In the late evening, an armed assailant wearing jeans, a white tshirt, a ski mask, and black gloves entered a 7-11 and demanded that
the cashier put money in a plastic shopping bag. The cashier complied, quickly emptying roughly $200 into the bag. The cashier was
the only other person in the store at the time. The robbery was captured on a surveillance camera videotape.
When police arrived, the cashier gave a brief description of the
suspect. The cashier reported that once outside the store, the perpetrator pulled off his ski mask, discarding both it and a gun as he
climbed quickly into a white Ford Taurus and sped off. The cashier
stated that he thought that the last two digits of the car’s Arizona license plate were “GB”. Police retrieved the gun and mask; neither
had usable fingerprints. The gun had been reported stolen several
years earlier by its original owner, who is now deceased.
Several police officers then began a search of the neighborhood
for a white Ford Taurus. Two hours after the crime, they found one,
parked 10 blocks from the crime scene. The last two digits of the license plate were “C8.” Department of Motor Vehicle records identified the owner as the defendant. The police knocked on the door to
his apartment. The defendant matched the height, weight and race of
the perpetrator in the surveillance videotape, and was wearing jeans
and a white t-shirt. The police then insisted that the defendant accompany them to the station-house to answer questions, which he did.
Upon arrival, the police led him to a room, locked the door, read
him his Miranda rights, and began interrogating him. The defendant
reported that he had been home alone all evening. The police allowed the cashier to listen in from the next room. The cashier reportedly said “that sounds like the guy.” The police then placed the
defendant under arrest. They obtained a search warrant and searched
his apartment. They found shopping bags similar to the one used by
the perpetrator of the crime and a pair of black gloves. The defendant also had several hundred dollars in cash in his wallet. The police
did not find firearms or ammunition of any kind.
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[Control condition: The police continued questioning the defendant, but he requested a lawyer and the interrogation ended.]
[Suppression condition: The police continued questioning the defendant. Even though the defendant clearly requested a lawyer, twice,
the police refused to call one and continued the interrogation. Two
hours later, the defendant confessed, and agreed to write out a description of the crime. His written description matched the events
perfectly, including the fact that he discarded the ski mask and gun
outside the store (which the police had not told him).
The defendant’s attorney has moved to suppress the confession,
arguing that the interrogation violated the defendant’s rights under
Miranda by continuing after the defendant had requested an attorney.
Would you grant the motion and suppress the evidence?
Yes

No]

Based solely on the evidence admitted at trial, would you convict
the defendant?
Yes

No

